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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
Essays in Entrepreneurship and Household Finance 
by 
Yoosef Ghahreman 
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics 
Washington University in St. Louis, 2016 
Professor Barton H. Hamilton, Chair 
My dissertation is focused on the relationship between financial and business decisions of 
households. The first essay examines how founders of new businesses changed their portfolios in 
the aftermath of the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Using the Survey of Consumer Finances 2007–
2009 panel data, I find evidence that those who became entrepreneurs (entrants) reduced 
financial portfolio risk compared to those who remained paid employees. I identify a movement 
away from stockholdings as a result of entry, and provide support for a response to the 
background risk arising from privately held businesses. Business ownership was also associated 
with changes in the real estate holdings of entrants. These findings highlight the link between 
private and public equity markets through entrepreneurs’ portfolio choices and introduce a 
connection between housing and entrepreneurship through changes in home ownership. The 
second essay studies the trends in angel investment in a representative sample of the U.S. 
economy and explores the characteristics of these individual private investors.1 Our results 
suggest that angel investment is highly concentrated among the wealthiest households, and 
wealth plays an important role in participation, even among the top 1% of wealth distribution. 
These wealthy households, who own the majority of the economy’s angel equity, increased their 
                                                 
1 The second essay is a joint work with Barton H. Hamilton. 
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participation in the angel investing market during the 1998–2010 period, unaffected by the 
recessions and financial crisis. In the representative sample, self-employment plays an important 
role in predicting the incidence of being an angel investor and angel equity share, but the 
relationship is not as robust for the subsample of the top 1%. Self-reported willingness to take 
financial risk is generally associated with a higher likelihood of being an angel investor and a 
larger share of angel equity in different specifications, especially for the 1%. The angels are 
likely to be more financially disciplined as measured by their credit card balances and how much 
effort they put into choosing their investments. Angels’ affluence, their higher financial 
discipline and more risk tolerance, together with the relatively low shares of angel equity in the 
portfolios of most angel investors might suggest calculated risk taking on the part of an average 
angel investor. 
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Chapter 1: How Did Entrepreneurs Self-
Finance New Ventures After the Financial 
Crisis? 
1.1 Introduction 
The decision to become an entrepreneur not only involves comparing two occupations with 
different returns, but also with substantially different risks. Entrepreneurs face high rates of 
failure in the early years of their businesses and more volatile incomes compared to paid 
employees. In addition, business ownership ties the return to labor with the return to 
entrepreneurial business assets. The positively correlated returns and greater risk, after starting a 
business, change the optimal choice of portfolio. The resulting adjustment in asset composition 
would change the return to the portfolio and consequently the return to becoming an 
entrepreneur. The higher concentration of risk in the earlier years2 of the business further 
highlights the importance of understanding the portfolio choices of nascent business owners.3 
However, the extent of the differential portfolio holdings for entrepreneurs vs. workers remains 
an empirical question: How does becoming a business owner affect the portfolio holdings? We 
seek to learn the extent to which households rebalance their portfolios after entry. When the 
                                                 
2 Becoming an entrepreneur increases uncertainty for individuals regarding returns to both their time and capital. In 
addition to the uncertainty of the return to their working time, they also experience a great degree of positively 
correlated risk associated with their entrepreneurial assets. This risk is even more pronounced for businesses in their 
initial years, where they face the prospect of failure and exit. 
3 For example, the decision to start a business might result in individuals increasing stockholdings to diversify 
against the business risk, leading to lower average returns to the financial portfolio after starting a business. Hence, 
understanding the portfolio choice would help our understanding of total returns to occupations which also includes 
the return to non-business assets. This relationship connects our work also to the literature on returns to 
entrepreneurship and private equity premium puzzle (Hamilton 2000; Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen 2002; 
Kartashova 2014). 
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business requires capital investment, this would help us understand what assets households use to 
self-finance the expenses related to a new business venture. The households may bear the 
expenses of starting up their businesses by different means such as selling some of their safe or 
risky financial assets, taking out a mortgage or other loans, or selling their real assets. In order to 
answer the question above, we utilize the Survey of Consumer Finances 2007-2009 panel data. 
The first wave of the data was concluded in the early stages of the downturn and the second 
wave was collected after its major consequences for household portfolios had surfaced. This adds 
another dimension to the question: It enables us to study a special period when it was particularly 
difficult to access outside financing. 
We provide evidence of a shift away from stocks in the portfolio holdings of entrants into 
business ownership, compared to those who remained workers. This is despite the fact that 
business entrants tend to have more risk tolerance in our sample. Moreover, we find evidence 
suggesting that the entrants were more likely to sell their primary housing assets. This result 
might suggest the liquidation of some of the housing assets to fund business startups or improve 
credit conditions.  
This paper is related to a body of work that studies the implications of background risk on 
portfolio choice. Background risk, which is defined as risk that cannot be avoided by trading or 
insuring, is one of the most widely studied environmental factors in explaining the heterogeneity 
in household risk taking (see Guiso and Sodini 2013 for references). Most of the empirical 
literature on the background risk utilizes cross-sectional evidence. The complication with these 
cross-sectional studies is the difficulty to identify the effect of background risk on portfolio 
choice from the unobservable characteristics that might drive the relationship. For example, in 
the case of private business risk, cross-sectional inferences on the effect of background risk are 
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based on comparing portfolio holdings of individuals with different occupations, rather than 
comparing the portfolio of the same individual under different occupations. If the people of 
different occupations have different unobserved characteristics, what we estimate as the effect of 
an occupation on portfolio holdings might reflect differences in those unobservables.  
Panel data helps alleviate such concerns by controlling for the time-invariant unobservables. 
While this helps control for more persistent unobservable variables, such as human capital, it 
may fall short of controlling for changes in other assets, such as housing, which are endogenous 
to the financial portfolio, (Guiso and Sodini 2013). Calvet and Sodini (2014) use twin 
regressions to control for the family background and genetics. While they find robust evidence of 
the positive effect of financial wealth for financial risk taking, the evidence they provide for the 
effect of background risk could still be subjected to unobserved environmental characteristics 
which are beyond genes and family. For example, while twin data helps control for some sources 
of wealth shocks such as inheritance, there may be other sources such as differential changes in 
stock prices which are difficult to distinguish from the endogenous responses to those shocks 
unless one could use detailed high frequency data.  
To shed light on the effect of background risk in general and the risk from private businesses in 
particular, we use the variation in the fixed cost of becoming an active business owner. Using an 
instrumental variables strategy, we find support for the casual effect of background risk on the 
financial portfolio. Furthermore, we find that in the absence of our identification strategy, the 
panel analysis would lead to the opposite conclusion.  
The focus on the privately held business is not only worthwhile in testing the implication of 
background risk, but also in the importance of private equity for aggregate portfolio holdings and 
asset prices (Heaton and Lucas 2000a; Heaton and Lucas 2000b). For instance, the extent of 
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substitution between public and private equity may prove helpful in linking the secular decline in 
business entry and growth (Decker et al. 2016) to the rise in participation in public equity 
markets in the recent decades (Hong, Kubik, and Stein 2004).  
On the other hand, understanding the endogenous portfolio responses to entrepreneurship 
policies helps evaluate the effectiveness of such policies. Examples of such policies are loan 
provision, downside insurance, or tax incentives. As we will discuss in the next section, the 
underlying mechanism behind the endogenous changes in portfolios have implications for what 
policies could affect business entry and quality of businesses.  
Our work is especially related to Heaton and Lucas (2000a) and Faig and Shum (2002) who 
study the implications of income uncertainty for the portfolios of entrepreneurs. Heaton and 
Lucas (2000a) use cross-sectional evidence to show that entrepreneurs with high and variable 
business income hold less wealth in stocks, which they attribute to diversification in response to 
business income uncertainty. A second reason why entrepreneurs may hold safer financial 
portfolios is to have enough liquidity for the future financing needs of their businesses. Faig and 
Shum (2002) provide theory and cross-sectional evidence for such liquidity needs, where 
personal illiquid projects, such as a business or housing, result in safer financial portfolios.  
We test the implication of these theories using the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) panel 
data and find support for the diversification in response to the background risk. Our difference-
in-differences strategy allows us to control for time-invariant unobservable variables and 
common time trends, while the instrumental variable approach helps single out the direct effect 
of background risk from the latent characteristics. Moreover, our study puts an extra emphasis on 
the early years of the businesses which are potentially more important for occupational choice. 
As we will discuss in Section 2.2, the evidence of diversification against background risk 
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provides support for effectiveness of a Downside Insurance Policy and similar policies that 
improve the exit option of the entrepreneur, while the evidence counters the effectiveness of a 
Loan Provision Policy which is likely to result in inefficiencies. 
On the other hand, we have an additional focus on the non-financial portfolios of new business 
entrants. There are a number of recent studies on whether housing assets affect entrepreneurial 
activity through alleviating financial constraints (Schmalz, Sraer, and Thesmar 2015; Kerr, Kerr, 
and Nanda 2015; Jensen, Leth-Petersen, and Nanda 2014; Adelino, Schoar, and Severino 2015). 
In these studies, the main driver of the relationship between housing and entrepreneurship is that 
higher home equity increases the access to lending. However, we focus on another mechanism 
that links the housing and entrepreneurship, which might be particularly important in the time of 
scarcity of external resources following the financial crisis. Unlike the studies that consider the 
role of housing assets through providing collateral, we provide evidence suggestive of change in 
ownership of housing equity after business entry.  
In Section 2, we discuss the theoretical background and policy implication of theories. Section 3 
describes the data and summary statistics. In Section 4, we establish a causal link between 
entrants’ financial portfolios and the background risk. In Section 5, we document the relationship 
between entry and change in ownership of primary residence. Section 6 concludes.   
1.2. Conceptual Framework 
In this section, we discuss how the business ownership is connected to the portfolio choice and 
how this relationship could be affected by policy. We first discuss the relevant theories. Next, we 
lay out their implications for some entrepreneurship policies. 
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1.2.1 Theoretical Background 
There are two theoretical approaches to explain why business owners may hold safer financial 
portfolios. One approach is to ensure that preferences satisfy a condition characterized by Pratt 
and Zeckhauser (1987), called “proper risk aversion.” It implies that entrepreneurs would be less 
willing to take other types of risk in the presence of the background risk from privately owned 
businesses. Hence, they respond to the business risk by making their financial portfolio safer. 
The other approach is to consider the future financing needs of the businesses, which could cause 
entrepreneurs to hold fewer stocks (Faig and Shum 2002). The latter theory implies that if certain 
liquidity needs are not met, the business faces a risk of failure. In response, the business owners 
would shift assets from risky stocks to safer financial assets to ensure future liquidity needs will 
be met even if the value of stocks goes down. 
A broad literature in household finance has established the relationship between background risk 
and portfolio choice. Background risk is the most widely studied factor to explain the substantial 
heterogeneity in household asset holdings (Guiso and Sodini 2013). The idea is that the risk 
arising from illiquidity or market incompleteness makes households unwilling to invest in risky 
financial assets. The background risk is any type of risk that cannot be traded or insured, such as 
human capital, housing wealth, privately held business, and health.4 We specifically focus on 
private businesses, which are not only important for the study of entrepreneurship, but also for 
aggregate portfolios and asset pricing (Heaton and Lucas 2000a).  
                                                 
4 For example, for human capital see Bodie et al. (1992), for housing wealth see Cocco (2005), Yao and Zhang 
(2005) and Hu (2005), for private business wealth see Heaton and Lucas (2000a; 2000b) and for health see Rosen 
and Wu (2004). 
20 
 
In theory, for background risk to reduce effective risk taking on financial portfolios, the utility 
function should satisfy the proper risk aversion condition, which necessitates that an undesirable 
lottery could never be made desirable by the presence of an independent, undesirable lottery. 
Proper risk aversion holds for power, exponential, and logarithmic utility functions. This 
condition in our framework would imply a rebalancing away from stocks toward safer financial 
assets in response to increase in the business risk. Nonetheless, whether the relation is causal 
remains an empirical question rather than a theoretical one. As argued in the introduction, most 
of the existing evidence of such a relationship is confounded by unobservables. To test the 
implication of theories of background risk, we use an instrumental variable strategy to identify 
the causality from a particular source of background risk resulting from the privately held 
businesses. 
The alternative theoretical explanation for safer financial asset holdings of entrepreneurs is based 
on future liquidity needs. Even in the absence of background risk, the future liquidity 
requirements of private businesses would imply less risk taking in the financial portfolio. Faig 
and Shum’s (2002) model implies that a household with an illiquid personal project, such as a 
business or house, will hold more safe assets to ensure that they will have access to liquidity 
when they would need financing for their project; otherwise, they would lose (or risk losing) the 
project, e.g. through bankruptcy or foreclosure. 
Both background risk and liquidity needs would generally predict less risk taking in the financial 
portfolio. Given the same amount of financial assets, this would mean holding fewer stocks and 
more safe financial assets. But this could also imply a large decrease in stocks and a smaller or 
no change in safe financial assets; total financial assets could fall especially if financial assets are 
used to fund the business-related activities.  
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Nevertheless, diversification and liquidity-based models offer different predictions for pre-entry 
portfolios of business owners. To distinguish future liquidity mechanism from diversification 
motives in response to background risk, we follow a strategy similar to what Faig and Shum 
(2002) use to provide evidence for their theory. We test whether those who will start a business 
or express tendency toward starting a business end up holding a safer financial portfolio. Faig 
and Shum (2002) predict that they would decrease financial risk tolerance even prior to 
becoming a business owner, while diversification motives would not imply a differential 
financial portfolio before exposure to business risk. 
Liquidity-based theories also have implications for how initial asset holdings are affected by 
future borrowing constraints and financial sophistication. Those most constrained or financially 
savvy are predicted to make the greatest adjustments to their portfolio. Hence, an increase in the 
effect of business on portfolio risk after controlling for measures of financial sophistication or 
future borrowing constraints would be in line with this theory.  
The models we discussed typically view rebalancing made in the financial assets; this may not 
necessarily be the case. Similar forces may call on a household to adjust illiquid housing assets, 
thereby increasing access to credit or limiting exposure to risk. For instance, the mechanism 
suggested by Faig and Shum (2002) could be generalized to include other means of facilitating 
access to future financing. An alternative to reducing financial risk is to pay off some of their 
debt to increase the credit-worthiness. Another strategy is to increase total financial assets; even 
if households keep the proportion of stocks constant, this will serve the purpose of meeting 
future liquidity demands. Hence, a downsizing in real estate to enhance future liquidity could be 
interpreted as a liquidity mechanism if it coincides with a fall in leverage or a rise in total 
financial assets. If such liquidity mechanism is at work, we would also expect that those who are 
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initially more credit-constrained be more likely to improve their credit conditions to enhance 
their future options.5 
To summarize, we use preprogram regressions to test the implications of the liquidity-based 
theories. Then we will present how portfolios respond to entry, and discuss whether it is 
consistent with theories of background risk or future liquidity needs.  
1.2.2 Policy Implications 
The extent of portfolio rebalancing and the theoretical explanations have implications for the 
effectiveness of entrepreneurship and labor policies. In the introduction, we noted how 
quantitative findings could be used for explaining changes in rates of entrepreneurship or effect 
of self-employment policy on business creation. In this section we address the implication of 
each theory for relative effectiveness of entrepreneurship policies.  
While diversification against background risk helps entrepreneurs smooth their consumption, 
liquidity motives help them with smooth continuation of their businesses. Despite the similarities 
between these mechanisms, the theories have different implications for policy. For simplicity, we 
will call the diversification response of individuals to background risk as diversification motive 
or diversification.  
To understand the policy implications, first note that the theories differ in how business owners 
respond to the option value of exit from entrepreneurship. The option of going back to wage 
                                                 
5 The focus on primary residence relates our work to the models of housing demand over the life cycle. However, 
selling homes is not a dominant response of households in these models mostly due to large transactions costs. Li et 
al. (Forthcoming) estimate the cost of selling homes to be 15% of the house value, including the 5-6 percent 
commission charge by a realtor for selling a house, and also taking into account search costs, moving costs, 
mortgage closing costs, as well as possible psychological costs. Bajari et al. (2013) estimate a model of housing 
demand where they include credit constraints in the form of minimum down-payment requirements for mortgages. 
They find muted response of housing to credit constraints in the short run because of adjustment costs. Attansio et 
al. (2012) model housing demand over the life cycle and find that individuals delay purchasing their first home when 
their incomes are uncertain. 
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work may result in more risk-tolerance if diversification is the main motivation. The option value 
of exit makes entrepreneurship more attractive as a result of alleviating the downside risk of the 
business: If the business fails, there exists the option to work on somebody else’s business. 
However, in presence of liquidity needs, the option value of exit wouldn’t help alleviate the 
problem. If the entrepreneur does not have access to the liquidity the business requires, he will 
potentially miss high business returns as a result of lacking the funds. The fact that he could exit 
entrepreneurship doesn’t help alleviate the lack of liquidity. 
Another distinction between the two types of motives is that diversification is due to 
consumption smoothing in case of a bad shock, such as business failure. However, the liquidity 
motive highlights the liquidity needs of the business, which arises when the business is not 
failing, in the sense that it survives the initial phase and needs liquidity for expansion or further 
survival.   
The above distinction makes the question of motives behind differential portfolio holdings not 
only theoretically but also practically relevant. The entrepreneur might change portfolio holdings 
in expectation of a bad shock or might alternatively need liquidity to expand. This influences the 
implications of a policy directed toward lowering the entrepreneurial risk and encouraging higher 
stockholdings for entrepreneurs. An example is providing downside insurance for entrepreneurs 
(Hombert et al. 2014). Any such policy could potentially make entrepreneurship more attractive 
by increasing the returns to entrepreneurship.  
To see how diversification versus liquidity motives matter for policy, consider two types of 
policies aimed at making entrepreneurship more attractive. First, consider a policy which 
removes future borrowing constraints for entrepreneurs; in other words, it provides loans to 
previously established businesses. Call it “Loan Provision Policy.” This results in more risk 
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taking by entrepreneurs in presence of both diversification and liquidity motives, but has 
different implications for the type of businesses it targets.  
If diversification motive is at work, such a policy will insure against the downside of the 
business, which will help entrepreneurs with failed businesses.6 A drawback of such policy will 
be that it will provide incentive to keep the business despite its failure in order to qualify for the 
loan targeted at entrepreneurs. This will result in an undesirable allocation of resources. On the 
other hand, although it may potentially make entrepreneurship more attractive, it may not reward 
the type of entrepreneurship that is most beneficial to the economy. If the final objective of 
encouraging entrepreneurship is to enhance job creation, this policy will come short of that, since 
it targets the business failures rather than businesses with growth potentials.   
Nonetheless, when the liquidity motive is dominant, Loan Provision Policy will facilitate the 
provision of liquidity to businesses which succeed, rewarding those with highest growth 
potential, which comes at a high benefit to the economy. Hence, the liquidity motives may much 
better justify Loan Provision Policy. 
Now consider another type of policy, namely “Downside Insurance Policy.” Such policy could 
take the form of a training program or an extension of unemployment insurance to entrepreneurs. 
A case of the latter is studied by Hombert et al. (2014) who evaluate the effect of a generous 
downside insurance which was provided to the French unemployed. Downside Insurance Policy 
enhances entrepreneur’s options in case of business failure, e.g. facilitates the return of the 
entrepreneur to work as a paid employee or to start another business. If liquidity motive is 
                                                 
6 In some sense, the question is to what extent entrepreneurs are concerned about the failure of their businesses. If 
the diversification motive dominates it means that they care a great deal and change their portfolios considering the 
chance of failure, where liquidity motive domination will mean that they are more concerned about the initial 
success of the business and the liquidity needs that come with it. In that sense the literature implying over-
confidence of entrepreneurs may be more consistent with liquidity motives. 
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dominant, Downside Insurance Policy would not be able to change the portfolios held by the 
entrepreneurs; in other words, the presence of a more attractive exit option would not solve the 
problem of an entrepreneur who needs liquidity. Hence he would hold a similarly less risky 
portfolio, as in absence of the Downside Insurance Policy, to meet future liquidity needs. As a 
result, Downside Insurance Policy comes short of changing entrepreneurs’ incentives in presence 
of liquidity motives.  
On the other hand, in presence of diversification motives, Downside Insurance Policy will be 
effective in inducing insurance against downside risk, as it increases the option value of exit 
from entrepreneurship. This will result in riskier portfolio holdings by entrepreneurs and higher 
returns to their portfolio. To summarize, Downside Insurance Policy is effective in presence of 
diversification motives, where Loan Provision Policy was more effective in presence of liquidity 
motives. 
Note such policies will make entrepreneurship more attractive if they increase the returns to the 
portfolio held by entrepreneurs, by enabling them to have riskier and higher return portfolios in 
absence of future financing constraints. Whether either of two motives is at work makes a 
difference in the effect of policies on the exit option value of an entrepreneur, and subsequently 
on entry to entrepreneurship.  
1.3 Data 
To study how the portfolio of new business owners changed between 2007 and 2009, we use the 
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) 2007-2009 panel data. The panel dimension is valuable in 
allowing us to have observations on the same people both when they are employees and 
entrepreneurs.  
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The Survey of Consumer Finances is a triennial survey, which is considered as a primary source 
for the static analysis of household portfolio (Heaton and Lucas 2000a). It is also considered as 
the gold standard for the American wealth data (Scholz and Seshadri 2009), due to its high-
quality detailed data and the oversampling the of wealthy households.  In the aftermath of the 
financial crisis, a follow up survey was conducted in 2009 to enable the study of change in 
household finances at the period.  
The field period for 2007 SCF concluded in the beginning of 2008, when the economic downturn 
was in its early stages and the 2009 re-interviews took place between July of 2009 and January 
of 2010, when there were signs of the nascent recovery (Bricker et al. 2011) 
We define financial assets as the amount of checking and saving accounts, call accounts, money 
market accounts, stock and bond mutual funds, directly held stocks and bonds, IRAs and thrift-
type accounts, cash value of life insurance, other managed assets (such as trusts and annuities) 
and other financial assets (such as loans and royalties). It excludes residential and investment 
real estate, and private equity.  
We define stocks as direct stockholdings, stock mutual funds, and retirement assets consisting 
mainly of stocks. Safe financial assets are defined as non-stocks financial assets. Business 
ownership as defined as ownership and active management of a business, while business 
investment indicates holding private business shares without active involvement in the business 
management. Correspondingly, business owners are active managers of their businesses, while 
business investors are not involved in management of the businesses. Entrepreneur in our context 
means a household who owns and actively manages a business and a worker is defined as a 
household who does not own actively managed businesses.  
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We restrict the sample to those who are not business owners in 2007 to focus on new business 
owners. We use the sample weights, not population weights, throughout the paper. SCF datasets 
include detailed data on assets held by the households in a representative sample of the US 
households. The 2007-2009 panel data further allows us to control for unobserved characteristics 
of households. 
Table 1.1 shows how different those who became business owners are from others. The first two 
columns illustrate the characteristics and asset holdings of those who transition to 
entrepreneurship between 2007 and 2009. Column 1 corresponds to 2007, before becoming a 
business owner, and column 2 corresponds to 2009, after becoming an owner. The third and 
fourth columns of Table 1.1 demonstrate the characteristics and asset holdings of those who were 
workers in both 2007 and 2009. Table 1.1 has four panels. Panel A shows some demographic 
characteristics of households, as well as measures of risk tolerance and credit constraints.  Panel 
B demonstrates median and third quartile values of asset and debt holdings, and Panel C shows 
average shares of different assets in households’ portfolios. Panel D reports additional measures 
for leverage and risk tolerance. 
Looking at Panel A of Table 1.1, entrants and non-entrants have similar average ages, but 
entrants are less likely to be female, more likely to be married and college-educated. Entrants are 
less likely to be credit-constrained7, and more willing to take high risk in expectation of high 
rewards. As Table 1.1’s Panel B shows, there are large gaps between second and third quartiles 
of assets and debts, reflecting the skewness of assets and debt distribution. The entrants tend to 
                                                 
7 In 2007 (2009), a household is called credit constrained if they were denied full amount of credit or loan in the past 
five (two) years or did not apply, since they expected they would be denied. 
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be wealthier: they have much more stocks, safe financial assets and primary residence, which is 
reflected in their larger total assets. The 2007–2009 period have been unfavorable to both 
entrants to business ownership and non-entrants in terms of how well they did according to their 
total assets and debt. Assets decrease for both groups, but more so for non-entrants. The median 
values for entrants are similar in magnitude to the third percentile values for non-entrants in all 
Panel B variables (except business ownership, which is different by definition). This may 
suggest that wealth may explain much of the differences in portfolio composition. 
The shares, rather than values, may provide a better picture of changes in the financial portfolios. 
Panel C reports average shares of different assets as percentages of total assets (the percentages 
sum up to 100%). The overall picture that Panel C provides is consistent with financial portfolios 
of entrants becoming safer. Entrants hold a riskier financial portfolio in 2007, which becomes 
less risky in 2009. The share of stocks in total assets falls a great deal for entrants in this period, 
when it falls less for non-entrants. Although facing the financial crisis, there are minor changes 
in the average shares of different components of portfolio for those who remain workers. The 
average share of the business ownership (i.e. actively managed businesses) in portfolios goes up 
from zero to 15.8% for those who become entrepreneurs. They held about 4.5% share of business 
investment (i.e. not actively managed) in their 2007 portfolio when they were workers. Non-
actively managed businesses held by workers are negligible comparatively. The introduction of 
actively managed businesses to portfolios of those who become entrepreneurs coincides with 
relatively large reductions in stocks and primary residence shares of assets.  
The above evidence suggests entrants rebalanced portfolios toward less holdings of stocks. There 
is a weaker evidence for rebalancing toward more safe financial assets. Under the assumption of 
similar changes in asset prices for entrants and non-entrants, we may interpret the rebalancing as 
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an active response of entrepreneurs to background risk or business liquidity needs. We will look 
closer at this issue in Section 4, where we control for different variables that might drive the 
change in financial portfolio composition. 
Panel D shows that entrants have larger loan to value ratios for their primary residences. The 
larger share of stocks in entrants’ financial assets and their lower shares of cash are also 
consistent with their higher risk tolerance, where cash is defined as money in checking and 
saving accounts, call accounts and money market accounts. Home loan to value ratio increases 
for both groups after the financial crisis. Similar to what we found we stocks share of total assets, 
share of stocks in financial assets decreases more for entrants. Hence, entrants decrease their 
shares of stocks more than non-entrants on average, whether the share is computed relative to 
financial assets or total assets. Both groups slightly increase cash holdings, which is computed as 
the money in checking and saving accounts, call accounts and money market accounts.   
1.4 The Impact of Business Ownership on Financial 
Portfolios 
In this section, we provide evidence for diversification of business entrants against background 
risk of businesses. We use share of stocks and other financial assets as the dependent variables 
and the share of the business assets for entrants as the variable of interest. The 2009 business 
share not only captures entry, but also proxies for how much the portfolio is affected by the 
business risk. Note that the business share in 2007 is 0 for everyone in the sample.  
We start by running preprogram regressions a la Heckman and Hotz (1989). In Section 4.2, we 
run difference-in-differences regression of stocks and safe financial assets on the business share 
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of entrants. Section 4.3 will use instrumental variable strategy to identify the effect of business 
share on financial risk taking.  
1.4.1 Preprogram Regressions for Financial Assets 
We start by a cross sectional regression of 2007 financial asset holdings on different sets of 
control variables, where we also include the share of businesses in 2009 as an explanatory 
variable. This helps us test the predictions of Faig and Shum (2002) that future liquidity needs 
would imply making the financial portfolio safer. 
Furthermore, these regressions helps us diagnose potential selection issues. Heckman and Hotz 
(1989) call them preprogram regressions. If we find no evidence for difference in 2007 financial 
assets between those with different 2009 business shares, we would provide support for no 
selection on unobservables, given that the equation for 2007 asset holdings is the same as the one 
for 2009 asset holdings (except for the additive entry effect). We employ the following model: 
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,07𝑘𝑘 = 𝛽𝛽0 + �𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖,07𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,09 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,07 (1.1) 
where 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,07𝑘𝑘  is the share of 𝑘𝑘 in total assets, where 𝑘𝑘 denotes stocks or safe financial assets. 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,09 is 
the share of actively managed business assets in 2009, hence measuring the extent of business 
entry. 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 includes household characteristics in 2007. We include four categories of explanatory 
variables in 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖,07. First, we control for basic demographic and socioeconomic variables which 
include a quadratic in age8, gender, marital status, log of labor income, length of tenure with the 
                                                 
8 The life cycle aspects of portfolio choice has gotten a great deal of attention in the literature. For example see 
Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005), Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2007), and Fagereng, Gottlieb, and 
Guiso (Forthcoming). 
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current employer and an indicator for being unemployed. Second, we control for financial 
sophistication and risk tolerance9, which could be correlated with business entry (Hurst and 
Lusardi 2004; Kihlstrom and Laffont 1979). Our controls include indicators for being college 
graduate and college drop-out, whether the credit card balances are paid in full (which could also 
reflect credit constraints), and indicators for financial planning period being next year, next few 
years, next 5–10 years or longer than 10 years (with next few months omitted). They also include 
indicators for willingness to take high risk for high rewards and average risk for average rewards 
(where willingness to take below average risk is omitted), and whether the household head was 
self-employed.  
Third, we control for measures of leverage and credit constraints, which also affect entry and 
scale of businesses.10 We include a variable that takes the value 1 if the household was denied 
full amount of credit or loan in the past five years or did not apply since they expected they 
would be denied. We also control for primary residence loan to value ratio and total debt to 
assets ratio11 as other proxies for credit constraints. Finally, we control for asset holdings and 
shares of assets. For simplicity we may call them balance sheet variables. The last group includes 
controls for total assets, total debt12, shares of primary residence, commercial real estate13, 
business investments (i.e. non-actively managed businesses), and cash in total assets, and share 
of stocks in financial assets. These variables not only control for the effect of different asset 
                                                 
9 Measures of risk tolerance could also reflect variations in expectations about financial returns (Malmendier and 
Nagel 2011). 
10 See Evans and Jovanovic (1989). For macro effects of credit constraints see Bassetto, Cagetti and De Nardi 
(2015) and Buera, Jaef and Shin (2015). 
11 Total debt to asset ratio is controlled for as log of total debt to assets plus 1. 
12 More precisely, we control for log of assets plus 1 and log of debt plus 1, in order to keep observations with zero 
values. 
13 Note we control for measures of both debt and value of housing (through loan to value ratios and housing shares) 
which capture the possibly of differential effects of home equity and mortgage debt on stockholdings (Chetty, 
Sándor and Szeidl (Forthcoming)). 
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components, for example share of primary residence which is both a hedge against future rents 
and a risky investment, but also proxy for the background risk and risk tolerance. Many of these 
variables are among the standard variables used to explain the financial asset holdings of 
households in the literature, where the main focus of this literature has also been on 
stockholdings.14  
Table 1.2 shows the results of preprogram regressions. Columns 1 and 2 show the direct 
correlations between the dependent variables and 2009 business shares. Entrants are expected to 
hold 0.07 percentage point (pp.) more in stocks’ share and 0.07 pp. less in safe financial share in 
2007 for each 1 pp. increase in 2009 business share. The estimates are fairly imprecise, but the 
amounts are not negligible. For the average entrant, with a business share of 15.8% in 2009, this 
will amount to a 1.15 percentage point higher share of stocks, which is nearly 10% of their 
average stock holdings. The sign of the coefficients on the stocks and safe assets regressions are 
consistent with the idea that business entrants are more risk tolerant. Columns 3 and 4 
additionally control for demographic and socioeconomic variables, which could proxy for risk 
tolerance and asset shares (e.g. houses) through gender, age (which is correlated with wealth), 
marital status, gender, unemployment status and tenure. These additional controls drive the 
coefficient on the stock holdings regression all the way down to 0, but make very little change to 
the coefficient on the safe assets regression, bringing it only a bit closer to 0. Columns 5 and 6 
show the regression results when we add measures of financial sophistication and risk tolerance. 
High risk attitudes result in higher stockholdings and lower safe holdings. Average risk attitudes 
increase stockholdings but do not make a significant change in safe holdings. Column 7 and 8 
add assets, debt and asset shares, which pick up the effect of risk attitudes and add considerable 
                                                 
14 For example see Rosen and Wu (2004), Campbell (2006), Shum and Faig (2006). 
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explanatory power to the regression. The explanatory power is expected since we control for 
share of real estate, cash and business investments, which include a large fraction of the 
portfolio. Since all shares add up to 1, controlling for these shares explain a great deal of 
variation in share of stocks or safe financial assets. In the column 7, the coefficient on stocks is 
fairly close to zero. The addition of extra variables helps by providing more precisely estimated 
coefficients of business share for both stocks and safe financial assets. They lead to a decline in 
absolute value of the coefficient in Column 7, making it fairly close to zero. However, despite all 
the additional variables, Column 8 shows that the coefficient of the 2009 business share is three 
times as much as the one in Column 7 in absolute value, which indicates that the explanatory 
variables may not control satisfactorily for the risk tolerance when safe financial assets are the 
dependent variable. We will discuss the implications of preprogram regressions for the OLS 
coefficient in Section 4.2. In summary, while Table 1.2 might indicate the control variables for 
stock holdings rule out selection on 2007 characteristics, we would not be able to make the same 
argument for safe financial holdings. 
As discussed in Section 2.1, the preprogram regressions provide us with a way to test the 
implications of theories based on future liquidity needs. The results in Table 1.2 are not 
consistent with the predictions of Faig and Shum (2002), given that entrants expected a higher 
likelihood of entry in 2007 compared to non-entrants. Future liquidity needs would imply lower 
stock holdings and higher safe financial holdings for the would-be entrants, especially when they 
face credit constraints. We find the opposite effect for safe financial assets in all specifications in 
Table 1.2, which holds true before and after controlling for measures of risk tolerance, financial 
sophistication and credit constraints, and changes minimally in response to addition of these 
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variables.15 Note that the coefficient of business share in the stocks regression is always lower in 
absolute value than the coefficient of business share on the safe assets which suggests more risk 
taking in 2007 financial portfolios for future entrants.   
1.4.2 Relationship between Entry and the Financial Portfolio 
Here we use descriptive regressions to show the relationship between the change in financial 
portfolios and the share of businesses started between 2007 and 2009. We use the panel 
dimension of the data which helps us control for the time-invariant latent characteristics of the 
household.  
We use a difference-in-differences estimation to explore how entrepreneurship affects the 
portfolio choice of households. In order to get an idea of the difference between asset holdings of 
workers and entrepreneurs, we consider the change in share of asset i between 2007 and 2009 as 
the dependent variable. We compare this change in the share of asset holdings between those 
workers who became entrepreneurs with those who remained workers. The latter helps control 
for the time trend. In addition, we control for a variety of demographic and portfolio variables to 
take into account the differences between entrants and non-entrants. 
We estimate the following model: 
Δ𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
𝑘𝑘 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,07𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,07𝑘𝑘 2 + �𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖,07𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=3
+ 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,09 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,07  (1.2) 
                                                 
15 In unreported regressions, we also controlled for indicators of saving motives. Faig and Shum’s theory would 
imply that those saving for housing and businesses are likely to hold safer financial portfolios. We did not find 
evidence supporting this implication. 
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where Δ𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘  is the change in the share of asset 𝑘𝑘 relative to total assets at time 𝑡𝑡, where 𝑘𝑘 denotes 
stocks or safe financial assets. We control for a quadratic in the asset 𝑘𝑘’s share in 2007 to take 
into account the initial values of the shares. The other control variables are similar to the ones 
adopted in Section 4.2. 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,09 is the share of business assets in 2009, making 𝛾𝛾 the main parameter 
of interest. 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 includes demographic and socioeconomic variables, proxies for financial 
sophistication and risk tolerance, measure of credit constraint, and balance sheet and asset shares. 
𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖,07 is predetermined for all values of 𝑗𝑗 which reduces the concerns with endogeneity.  
Table 1.3 demonstrates the relationship between the change in the share of financial assets and 
the rise in business shares. Odd-numbered columns denote share of stocks as the dependent 
variable and even-numbered columns have share of safe financial assets as the dependent 
variable.  Columns 1 and 2 control for demographic and socioeconomic variables. Columns 3 
and 4 provide additional controls for financial sophistication and risk tolerance, credit constraints 
and balance sheet controls. These variables also help control for how household were affected by 
the financial crisis, as they capture differences in debt holdings, loan to value ratios, and stocks 
and housing shares. Columns 5 and 6 provide additional controls for financial discipline, 
occupation and industry, and health status. They include indicators for how much the household 
shopped for investment (high, moderate; low is omitted) and borrowing (high, moderate; low is 
omitted), and four indicators for health status (excellent, good, fair, with poor omitted). It also 
includes 6 occupation and 7 industry indicators, which helps capture the variation in how 
different occupations and industries were hit by the financial crisis.   
Columns 3 and 4 show our preferred specification which denotes a 0.14 pp. decline in the share 
of stocks and a 0.20 pp. decline in the share of safe financial assets associated with each 1% 
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increase in the business share. The estimates are very similar in all specification and all denote a 
larger decrease in the share of safe financial assets compared to stocks. At the face value, this is 
neither consistent with the predictions of background risk nor future liquidity needs, as we 
discussed in Section 2.1. 
However, the OLS estimates are likely to be biased. Despite the panel dimension and controlling 
for a wide variety of portfolio determinants, the OLS regressions do not identify a causal 
relationship between financial asset shares and privately held businesses. The coefficient on the 
business share in the stockholdings regression is likely to underestimate the magnitude of the 
effect of entry on stocks. The change in the share of stocks may be due to a change in ownership 
or prices. We are only able to see the change in the share of stocks on 2007 and 2009, but we do 
not observe the change in the prices of stocks. Those who experienced a larger increase in prices 
after 2007 may be more likely to enter due to the wealth effect. While they might adjust their 
portfolio by selling some of their stockholdings after entry, we might find no change in 
stockholdings, since the rise in stock prices could cancel out the selling of stocks. In such a 
scenario, if we have had controlled for stock prices we would have seen reduction in stock shares 
for entrants. Lacking data on stock prices prior to entry will result in an underestimation of the 
effect of stocks on businesses; hence, the absolute effect is likely to be larger in size than what 
OLS estimates suggest.  
On the other hand, as preprogram regressions implied, we cannot rule out selection for the share 
of safe financial assets: The higher the 2009 business share of entrants, the more likely it is that 
they held smaller 2007 safe shares. If we take this as evidence for more risk tolerance of entrants, 
beyond what is captured by observables in the safe assets regression, they would rebalance their 
financial portfolio to a lesser extent. In that case, the selection of more risk tolerant households to 
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be entrants would make them less willing to increase their safe financial assets after entry. 
Hence, if we could control properly for risk tolerance, they would have been more willing to 
increase the share of their safe financial holdings. This implies that using OLS for estimating the 
effect of the business share on the change in safe financial assets pushes the coefficient toward 
negative values; therefor the OLS coefficient and is likely to be a lower bound for the value of 
the estimated coefficient of interest in the safe financial assets regression.16 
Noting that the effect on safe financial assets are likely to be closer to zero than what we found 
in Column 4, we regard the estimated -0.20 as the lower bound for the effect of business share on 
the safe financial share. Hence, we will use the quite precisely estimated figure of -0.20 for safe 
financial assets to compare what we will identify as the causal effect of business entry of stocks 
in the next section.  
1.4.3 Identifying the Effect of Business Share on Stocks 
As we noted in the previous section, we would not be able to identify the effect of business 
ownership on the financial portfolio using the OLS regressions. We use instrumental variables to 
identify such an effect for stocks. Our findings would be consistent with diversification against 
background risk if we find that the decline in stocks is larger than decline in safe financial assets 
in response to rise in business share of entrants. Since -0.20 (with 95% confidence interval of [-
0.30,-0.11] ) could be regarded as the lower bound on the coefficient in the regression of safe 
financial assets, we would be able to provide support for diversification against background risk 
if we find that the coefficient on stocks regression is smaller.  
                                                 
16 Similar underestimation of the coefficient’s value would follow if we interpret that preprogram regressions imply 
a dislike for safe financial assets. An entrant who has obtained an additional option of investing on his own business 
might be willing to spend more safe assets to do so than a non-entrant. If we were able to observe and control for 
such dislike, the estimated coefficient would be closer to zero.  
38 
 
We exploit the changes in the cost of business entry as instruments for entrants’ share of 
businesses. In our baseline estimation, we use three instruments: share of business investment in 
2007 (where none of 2007 businesses are actively managed in our sample), self-employment of 
the household head in 2007, and past self-employment history of more than 3 years for the head 
in 2007. Although the entrants are not involved in management of businesses in 2007, the 
business investment provides them with more knowledge and a wider network, which decreases 
the cost of entry and running a business.  A larger share of business investment is likely to get 
more attention from the entrant and increase his exposure. On the other hand, self-employment 
status indicates a lower fixed cost of entry due to being one’s own boss. The self-employed 
people in our sample in 2007 do not report having a business, and all have zero value for 
businesses. However, they report a 15.2% share of business ownership in 2009. One concern 
might be that self-employment while not being a business owner is due to mismeasurement. 
Even if this is true, as long as the self-employed do not perceive their 2007 businesses as having 
positive value, the mismeasurement would not affect our findings. Many of the self-employed 
who are not business owners may be independent contractors. The survey does not ask about past 
business ownership, but past self-employment is likely to have been combined with business 
ownership, as with most of the self-employed, which could indicate higher business acumen and 
network, and lower cost of starting a new business.17  
We use the instrumental variables through the following two-stage specification: 
                                                 
17 Another distinction between self-employment and business ownership is in industry composition. The industry 
composition of the self-employed who do not identify as business owners is similar to the industry composition of 
independent contractors (Eisenach 2010): They are much more likely to be in construction, agriculture and services, 
and much less likely to be in manufacturing. 
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𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,09 = 𝜇𝜇0 + 𝜇𝜇1𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖07𝑘𝑘 + 𝜇𝜇2𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖07𝑘𝑘 2 + �𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖,07𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖,07 (1.3) 
Δ𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
𝑘𝑘 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖07𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖07𝑘𝑘 2 + �𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖,07𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏�𝑖𝑖,09 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,07 (1.4) 
Equation (1.3) implements the first stage of the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression, where 
the dependent variable is 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,09, the business share in 2009, and the control variables are similar to 
Equation (1.2). The second stage controls for all the variables in the first stage with the addition 
of the fitted values of business share, 𝑏𝑏�𝑖𝑖,09, from the first stage as the main variable of interest to 
take into account the endogeneity of 2009 business share.  
The exclusion restriction for our two-stage least squares estimation is that conditional on 
observables, the IVs are not correlated with share of stocks. First, note that all the instruments 
are predetermined. However, it is still important to control for any variables that might affect risk 
taking of household or how they respond to the financial crisis. For example, those with a larger 
housing share are likely to be affected more by falling prices in the aftermath of the housing 
meltdown. The variation in other asset shares could also influence how households are affected 
by the financial crisis. Hence it is important to take into account the asset composition in 2007. 
The importance of controlling for assets shares and balance sheet is reflected in the 2SLS 
estimates.  
Table 1.4 presents the 2SLS estimation results. Panel A reports the first-stage coefficients on 
instrumental variables, and Panel B reports the second-stage results. As Panel A shows, all three 
instruments predict higher shares of 2009 businesses. Share of business investment is significant 
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at 5% in all specifications, while self-employment of household head is significant at 5% at 
Columns 1 and 2 and significant at a little above 5% level at Column 3 and 4. Past self-
employment is not significant at the 10% level, but the findings remain intact when we omit past 
self-employment from the list of IVs, as we will see when we discuss Table 1.5.  
Panel B of Table 1.4 presents the second-stage estimations. Column 1 of Panel B shows a small 
change in stock shares in response to rise in business shares when we control for demographic 
and socioeconomic variables. Column 2 shows the regression results when we add controls for 
financial sophistication, risk attitudes and credit constraints. The effect becomes larger, but still 
not statistically significant at the 10% level. Column 3 is our preferred specification where we 
add additional controls for total assets, total debt and shares of primary residence and 
commercial real estate, as well as other asset shares. The estimated effect is -0.67 which is 
significant at the 5% level (with 95% confidence interval of [-1.3,-0.03]). The estimated effect is 
robust to adding additional control variables for financial discipline, health status, and industry 
and occupation codes. As Column 4 demonstrates, adding these variables results in a small 
change in the estimated coefficient. The signs of other variables are as expected, with more risk 
tolerance and more assets resulting in more stockholdings, and larger debt resulting in less 
stockholdings. 
This brings us to the main prediction of theories of diversification against background risk, that 
is, the financial portfolio would become safer as a result of rebalancing after business entry. 
Comparing the estimated effect of an additional 1% increase in business share on the stocks, 
which is -0.67, with the lower bound we computed in the previous subsection for safe financial 
assets, which is -0.20, the decline in stocks is more than three times larger than the upper bound 
on the decline in safe financial assets. 
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Hence, our findings are consistent with diversification against the background risk, given that 
both coefficients are fairly precisely estimated and the preprogram regressions rule out the future 
liquidity theory. Furthermore, we are able to quantify the effect of background risk arising from 
privately held businesses on financial risk taking. Note that despite the wide range of control 
variables, we would have reached the opposite conclusion in absence of our identification 
strategy. 
1.4.4 Robustness Tests 
Using our preferred specification, as in Column 3 of Table 1.4, we estimate a number of other 
two-stage least squares regressions to check the robustness of our findings. Table 1.5 reports the 
results. The coefficients estimated for the change in stocks share are all greater in absolute value 
than what we presented before. It suggests that our preferred estimation might underestimate the 
substitution between public and private equity, and each 1 pp. increase in business share might in 
fact result in about 1 pp. decrease in stocks, rather than 0.7 pp.  
Column 1 of Table 1.5 shows the estimates when we exclude those who had used to be actively 
involved in management of their 2007 business investments. These past managers are arguably 
more likely to change their status of their business investment to business ownership and go back 
to managing their old businesses. This is not what we intend to capture as the effect of entry, 
since it will lead to mismeasurement of actively managed businesses in 2009. The qualitative 
results remain robust to exclusion of past managers. 
A related concern with the IV strategy is that those with large share of business investment are 
already exposed to much of the business risk. On the other hand, large shares of 2007 business 
investment may rule it out as a good instrument. For example, consider the extreme case that one 
holds all assets in business investment. Although this person is likely to be very risk tolerant, we 
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could not capture this characteristic sufficiently since all other asset share would be zero. This 
may result in the violation of the exclusion restriction, as business investment could be very 
much correlated with the share of stocks in absence of good controls for risk tolerance.  
Columns 2 demonstrate the regression results when we exclude those with 2007 shares of 
business investment greater than 0.02, and Column 3 shows the results when we exclude those 
with 2007 share of business investment of greater than 0.1. Our findings remain qualitatively 
robust.  
Columns 4 shows the robustness to excluding those who became business owners without being 
self-employed. This may be due to misreporting of business investment, i.e. with no active 
management role, in 2009 as business ownership (of an active manager). To show that our 
finding is not driven by such mismeasurement we exclude all such observations, and we arrive 
again at a fairly precisely estimated decline in the share of stocks.  
In the last column we use alternative definition risky assets. One might argue that bonds are 
relatively risky and more so in the period of our study, hence we bundled stocks and bonds 
together as risky financial assets, regarding cash as its safe financial asset counterpart. Using the 
alternative definition, Column 5 shows a decline in the risky share in response to increase in 
business share.  
1.5 Relationship between Primary Residence and Business 
Entry 
In this section, we document that business entry is associated with a decline in housing assets as 
a result of selling and downsizing the primary residence. We will focus on primary residence, 
which is the main component of housing assets. The main reason for this focus is our access to 
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data on whether the households sold their primary residences between 2007 and 2009, which 
enables us to distinguish the change in ownership from change in prices. We start by running 
preprogram regressions. Then we will present how the change in housing share is related to 
business share for those who sold homes. Finally, to alleviate concerns about the differential 
home price changes driving the results, we will look at the decision of whether to sell the home 
owned in 2007, and how it is influenced by starting a business.  
1.5.1 Preprogram Regressions for Primary Residence 
Similar to Section 4, we start by running preprogram regression. Here, we consider two 
preprogram regressions on 2009 share and on selling a home between 2007 and 2009. First 
consider  
ℎ𝑖𝑖,07 = 𝛽𝛽0 + �𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖,07𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝛾𝛾𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖09 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,07 (1.5) 
where ℎ𝑖𝑖,07 is the 2007 share of primary residence in assets. The other control variables are 
similar to the one used in Section 4’s regressions. Table 1.6 presents the results. Column 1 
includes demographic and socioeconomic variables. Addition of financial and risk tolerance 
variables in Column 2 decreases the coefficient to almost a third of its value in Column 1. 
Column 3 further controls for balance sheet variables which decreases the coefficient to 0.031. 
The effect is neither statistically nor economically significant. 
The equation below shows the preprogram regression for selling homes between 2007 and 2009: 
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ℎ𝑖𝑖,07 = 𝛽𝛽0 + �𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖,07𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,07 (1.6) 
where 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 is an indicator of the whether the household sold their 2007 primary residence. The 
other control variables are similar to the regressions above. Table 1.6, Columns 4 – 6, present the 
results. Column 4 includes demographic and socioeconomic variables, and shows that those who 
sold homes had significantly more 2007 housing share of assets. Addition of financial and risk 
tolerance variables in Column 5 decreases the coefficient to almost one fourth. Controlling for 
balance sheet variables in Column 6 further decreases the coefficient to 0.024, which is not 
statistically and economically significant.  
Having no difference between 2007 housing shares for different business shares and between 
seller and non-sellers assures that our regressions satisfy a minimum requirement on lack of 
selection.  
1.5.2 Change in Primary Residence for Entrants 
In this section, we estimate two OLS regressions: 
Δℎ𝑖𝑖
𝑘𝑘 = 𝛽𝛽0 + ℎ𝑖𝑖07𝑘𝑘 + ℎ𝑖𝑖07𝑘𝑘 2 + �𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖,07𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,09 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,07 (7) 
Δℎ𝑖𝑖
𝑘𝑘 = 𝛽𝛽0 + ℎ𝑖𝑖07𝑘𝑘 + ℎ𝑖𝑖07𝑘𝑘 2 + �𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖,07𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,09 × 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,07 (8) 
In the first regression, we only include 2009 business share, where in the second we control for 
the interaction of business share with an indicator of whether the household sold its 2007 
primary residence.  
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Table 1.7 demonstrates how an increase in business share is associated with change in the share 
of primary residence for sellers and non-sellers. The results are very similar across 
specifications. Columns 3 and 4 show our preferred specification. As Column 3 shows, 1% 
increase in business share is associated with a -0.44% decrease in the share of primary residence. 
Column 4 breaks down this decline into changes in housing share for those who sold their homes 
and those who did not. Each 1% increase in business share of entrant is associated with a 1.05% 
decline in housing share for home sellers and a 0.36% decline for those who kept their homes. 
But why do we see such a decline in shares if they did not sell their homes? 
This fall in shares could be partly explained by the rise in assets due to increased business value 
minus business capital investment. For instance, assume that the household founds a business 
with no capital investment and all prices stay the same. This will result in no change in non-
business assets and a rise in total assets equal to the value of newly founded business assets.  For 
instance, consider a rise in the entrant’s business share from 0% to 16%, while everything else 
remaining constant, which is equivalent to a 13.8% increase in total assets. If entrant’s 2007 
home share equals to 32%, it will go down to 32/(100+13.8)=28%. In this example, without any 
change in housing, the household would experience a 28% fall in home share as a result of 
becoming a business owner. Let’s call this the mechanical effect of business expansion on asset 
shares, or in short mechanical effect. In the case of primary residence, the mechanical effect is 
the reduction in the share of primary residence merely due to the introduction of business assets 
to the portfolio, without any change in the value of primary residence.  
Now assume that sellers did not use any of their 2007 non-business assets for investing in 2009 
businesses. Assuming no such reallocation allows us to find an upper bound on the mechanical 
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effect.18 Given that the average entrant home-seller reduces homes share by -1.043 pp. (from 
Table 1.7 Column 4), holds 59% of assets in home share and has a business share of 19%, the 
lower bound on the downsizing of primary residence of entrant home-sellers would be 21%.19 If 
we assume that the ratio of average capital investment to business value for entrant home-sellers 
is bounded from above by 1, we can also compute an upper bound on home downsizing of 
entrant home-sellers equal to 33.6%.20  
1.5.3 Selling Primary Residence for Entrants 
So far the main variable of interest has been the share of businesses in 2009, which captures the 
extent to which the household has been exposed to business ownership. 
Here, we show that the change in asset shares that we found above are due to change in primary 
residence, and not merely a result of change in prices. One concern is that the change in housing 
prices might have been very different for those who became entrepreneurs, therefore making the 
differential change in asset shares reflect the change in house prices rather than change in the 
unit of residence or its ownership. 
                                                 
18 If we could observe the investment made by entrants in their 2009 businesses, we could compute the mechanical 
effect more accurately. But since we do not have that data, we compute an upper bound for the effect by assuming 
no investment in the newly started businesses. The mechanical effect would be the largest when the household 
becomes an owner of a valuable business at no monetary cost (e.g. through a business idea with no investment 
requirement). This would increase the denominator (total assets) to the largest degree, while causing no reduction in 
the nominator (the value of primary residence). On the other hand, if every unit of new business is funded from one 
unit of previously held assets, there would be no change in total assets. In this case, all changes in asset shares would 
be due to reallocation, rather than the mechanical effect.  
19 Let 𝑏𝑏 equal to business share in 2009, ℎ1 be the home share in 2007, ℎ2 the home share in non-business assets, 
and Δ𝐻𝐻 denote the estimated coefficient for business share for sellers. We will have 
ℎ21 + 𝑏𝑏 − ℎ1 = Δ𝐻𝐻 × 𝑏𝑏 
ℎ2 = (1 + 𝑏𝑏)(Δ𝐻𝐻 × 𝑏𝑏 + ℎ1) 
Therefore ℎ2 = 1.19 × (−1.043 × 0.19 + 0.59) = 0.466, and  ℎ2−ℎ1ℎ1 = −0.1240.59 = −21% 
20 Putting 𝑏𝑏 = 0 in footnote 11 would lead to the upper bound figure. 
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We will provide evidence for change in the likelihood of selling homes associated with entry. 
We will estimate probit regressions, using the following specification.  
Δ𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + ℎ𝑖𝑖07𝑘𝑘 + ℎ𝑖𝑖07𝑘𝑘 2 + �𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖,07𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝛾𝛾𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,09 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,07 (1.9) 
The dependent variable is an indicator of whether the household sold primary residence between 
2007 and 2009. The parameter of interest is 𝛾𝛾, and 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,09 is an indicator for entry, which takes the 
value of 1 if the household became a business owner. We control for a quadratic in share of 
primary residence. The control variables 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖,07 are similar to the ones we have had so far. We 
restrict the sample to those who had nonzero primary housing assets in 2007. 
Table 1.8 shows the results. Column 1 and 2 show the probit estimates and average marginal 
effects respectively, when controlling for the demographic and socioeconomic control variables. 
The probability of selling a home is 4.5 pp. higher for an entrant. It changes very little when we 
add controls for financial sophistication, risk tolerance and credit constraints in Columns 3 and 4. 
Columns 5 and 6 show our preferred estimation in which we also control for balance sheet 
variables and asset shares. As Column 6 indicates, the entry is associated with a rise in the 
probability of selling amounting to 3.5 percentage points. Using the estimation results, entry 
predicts a rise in the average likelihood of selling homes from 5.7% to 9.2%, which is equivalent 
to a 38% rise in the probability of selling homes for entrants. 
The effect remains significant at the 10% level after adding additional explanatory variables that 
control for health, industry, occupation and financial discipline. The findings confirm that there 
is a change in home ownership associated with entry.  
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Although preprogram regressions give us some assurance that selection is not dominant in 2007 
variables, in absence of a proper instrument for change in business share or entry, we are not able 
to investigate whether the effects we find are causal. The instruments we used for financial assets 
are unlikely to satisfy the exclusion restrictions. For example, self-employment and home 
ownership may be correlated beyond measures of risk and financial sophistication through a 
preference for control. Moreover, controls for risk tolerance, financial sophistication and assets 
shares may not capture preferences for housing and its consumption value.  
To the extent that the 2007 variables control for changes in wealth, for example through the 
share of stocks or housing in assets, or industries and occupations, they may facilitate a causal 
interpretation. However, differential change in home or stock prices between entrants and non-
entrants might drive part of the correlation we find between the selling of homes and entry.  
Nonetheless, irrespective of how much of the relationship is causal, the large effect of entry on 
housing has implications for the portfolios of entrepreneurs and possibly for their access to loans 
and liquidity. A remaining question is the extent to which this could be attributed to the effect of 
the financial crisis.  
1.6 Conclusion 
We study the differences in the asset holdings of business owners and workers by comparing 
changes in asset holdings associated with the business share of entrants. The empirical evidence 
indicates that business ownership is associated with a significant fall in households’ share of 
stocks. We argue that our estimates are causal, as the identification comes from the difference-in-
differences and the instrumental variable strategies. 
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Two theoretical approaches could explain our findings: diversification response to background 
risk and future liquidity needs. Based on preprogram regressions, it is unlikely that our results 
are driven by future liquidity needs a la Faig and Shum (2002). Hence, our findings provide 
support for the effect of background risk on making financial portfolios safer. Unlike most 
studies of background risk, we used panel data and introduced instrumental variables which 
could tackle the concerns with omitted variables in the existing studies of background risk. As 
we informally discussed, the empirical support for diversification has policy implications 
different from the liquidity channel. The evidence for diversification away from stocks in 
response to the background risk may provide support for effectiveness of an entrepreneurship 
policy that provides downside insurance to entrepreneurs. In contrast, a loan provision policy 
would not be an efficient way to encourage entrepreneurship.  
Many new entrepreneurs decreased their stock holdings relative to employees with similar 
observed characteristics. Our estimates show a nearly 0.7% decline in stocks’ share in response 
to each extra 1% of business share. For the average new business owner in our sample of nascent 
entrepreneurs, this amounts to a decline from 17.1% to 10.9% in the share of stocks as a result of 
entry. More strikingly, entry is associated with a rise in the likelihood of selling primary 
residence from 5.7% to 9.2%, which amounts to a 61% percent increase. These results are 
generally robust based on different subsamples and definitions of risky assets. This 
entrepreneurship differential may even be a lower bound for the change in portfolios of entrants 
due to presumably limited opportunities for portfolio adjusting in our sample due to its time 
period. Moreover, our robustness checks for change in stocks share suggests that our preferred 
estimation might underestimate the substitution between public and private equity, and each 1 
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pp. increase in business share might result in a decline closer to 1 pp. in stocks, rather than 0.7 
pp. 
Our finding of substantial changes in portfolios of entrants have potentially important policy 
implications. While in occupational choice models of entrepreneurship the financial portfolio is 
generally assumed to have an exogenous risk-free return21, considering the endogenous response 
of portfolio’s return and risk to occupational choice might change incentives to become an 
entrepreneur. As a result, a standard occupational choice model could overestimate or 
underestimate the effect of different entrepreneurship policies and lead to wrong conclusions. 
For example, the effect of entrepreneurial tax incentives on entry could be overestimated if it 
does not account for the effect of entry on the portfolio. The disincentive from lower expected 
financial returns due to less stockholdings after entry might dissuade some from becoming an 
entrepreneur. On the other hand, a similar occupational model might underestimate the effect of 
providing entrepreneurial downside insurance on entry. The downside insurance would not only 
encourage starting a business, but would also give an extra boost to expected financial returns 
due to higher stockholdings.22  
Furthermore, the evidence for substitution between private and public equity could potentially 
connect the secular decline in entrepreneurship with the rise in the stock market participation in 
the recent decades. Some of the decline in business entry could be explained by more stability in 
stock prices and lowered costs of investment in stocks. 
                                                 
21 for example Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) and Buera and Shin (2011). 
22 Note that the substitution between public and private equity would be larger in  
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On the other hand, our findings on home ownership propose an important new avenue which 
links housing and entrepreneurship, through which entrepreneurship is associated with change in 
housing ownership, rather than price changes. The results are in line with a mechanism through 
which credit constraints result in selling housing assets in response to a credit crunch. For credit-
constrained households, homes are less valuable, as housing has lost its value as collateral after 
the crisis. Thus, they could downsize their homes and invest in other assets, while keeping the 
option to increase their housing assets after the credit crunch, when houses are also useful as 
collateral. Many households have shifted their investments, including illiquid housing, toward 
better opportunities even at the time of the housing meltdown and stock market crash. 
The conclusion that those who launched businesses rebalanced portfolios by decreasing the 
holdings of their riskier assets appears to be quite robust. Nevertheless, future research could 
enhance the findings in a number of directions. First, the analysis focuses on the period 
following the financial crisis. The findings may be different for other periods, when real estate 
assets have higher value as collateral. Second, we have not stressed differences in the dynamics 
of asset allocation. To the extent that the two-year period of follow-up in our study does not 
reflect the shorter-term changes in asset allocation, our conclusions would be strengthened since 
individuals would have changed their asset allocation more dramatically closer to the time they 
started their businesses. Third, the results presented here are of a reduced form. A structural 
estimation would allow us to consider the portfolio and occupational choice as a joint decision. 
Such estimates would require a specification of household utility and characterization of 
employment and earnings sequences over the life cycle. 
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1.7 Appendices 
1.7.1 Tables 
Table 1.1 Summary Statistics 
 
 Became Owner     Remained Worker  
2007 2009  2007 2009 
Panel A. Demographic Variables     
Age of Respondent 50.02 52.36  50.38 52.47 
Female 11.3% 11.3%  27.6% 27.6% 
Married 76.7% 75.2%  59.2% 53.4% 
College Drop-out 19.5% 19.1%  17.2% 17.4% 
College Graduate 60.9% 60.3%  39.3% 39.8% 
Average Risk Att. 44% 48%  40% 41% 
High Risk Attitudes 35% 31%  20% 14% 
Credit Constraineda 16.5% 17.3%  20.9% 21.7% 
Panel B. “Median/Third Quartile” Asset and Debt Holdings (Divided by 1000)  
Assets $902/$5,925 $863/$5,640  $232/$674 $207/$570 
Debt $147/$314 $136/$373  $24/$135 $23/$138 
Stocksb $59/$762 $47/$848  $2/$79 $3/$61 
Safe Financial Assetsc $78/$644 $96/$782  $19/$117 $18/$111 
Business Ownership $0/$0 $37/$708  $0/$0 $0/$0 
Primary Res. Assets  $395/$1,257 $354/$961  $131/$314 $121/$278 
Primary Res. Debt $103/$225 $81/$223  $0/$105 $0/$101 
Panel C. Average Shares     
Business Ownership Share 0% 15.8%  0% 0% 
Stocks Share of Assets 17.1% 13.4%  11.6% 10.8% 
Safe Financial Share Assets 19% 18.8%  23.3% 24.8% 
Business Inv. Share 4.5% 1.3%  0.05% 0.06% 
Home Share of Assets 36% 30.1%  38.2% 39.6% 
Inv. Real Estate Share 12.6% 12.4%  6% 5.7% 
Other Non-Fin. Share 10.8% 8.2%  20.5% 18.5% 
Panel D. Other Variables     
Home Loan to Value 31.50% 34.50%  24.80% 27.90% 
Stock Share of Financial 39% 33.60%  27% 26.30% 
Cash Share of Assetsd 5.50% 5.80%  9.10% 9.80% 
Observations 133 133  2,578 2,578 
Notes: The first two columns show the 2007 and 2009 summary statistics for those who became business owners in 
2009. The third and fourth columns show the 2007 and 2009 summary statistics for those who remained workers in 
2009. A household is called a business owner if it owns a business and has an active management role in it. 
Otherwise, it is called a worker. All variables are reported in means. The sample weights, not population weights are 
used throughout the paper, and those 2007 business owners who actively managed their businesses are excluded. 
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a The definition of the indicator for being credit constrained is different in 2009 from the one in 2007. In 2007 
(2009), a household is called credit constrained if they were denied full amount of credit or loan in the past five 
(two) years or did not apply, since they expected they would be denied. 
b Stocks include both directly and indirectly held stocks. 
c Safe financial assets are defined as total financial assets minus stocks. Total financial assets include checking and 
saving accounts, call accounts, money market accounts, stock and bond mutual funds, directly held stocks and 
bonds, IRAs and thrift-type accounts, cash value of life insurance, other managed assets (such as trusts and 
annuities) and other financial assets (such as loans and royalties). It excludes real estate and private equity. 
d Cash is defined as money in checking and saving accounts, call accounts and money market accounts.* Do not 
include in the table of contents. 
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Table 1.2 Preprogram Regression of Stocks and Safe Financial Assets 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Stocks 
Share 
Safe 
Share 
Stocks 
Share 
Safe 
Share 
Stocks 
Share 
Safe 
Share 
Stocks 
Share 
Safe 
Share 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Business 
Share 2009 
0.073 -0.071 -0.004 -0.059 -0.039 -0.052 0.016 -0.048 
(0.061) (0.066) (0.059) (0.066) (0.056) (0.062) (0.034) (0.030) 
Average Risk     0.060*** 0.008 -0.007 0.020** 
     (0.007) (0.013) (0.005) (0.010) 
High Risk     0.110*** -0.040*** 0.001 0.004 
     (0.010) (0.013) (0.007) (0.011) 
Log(Asset+1)       0.024*** 0.029*** 
       (0.002) (0.004) 
Log(Debt+1)       -0.003*** -0.004*** 
       (0.001) (0.001) 
Stocks/Fin.       0.388*** -0.228*** 
       (0.013) (0.013) 
Business Inv.       -0.381*** -0.505*** 
       (0.036) (0.032) 
         
DemogSocio.a NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Risk&Sophis.b NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
CredConstr.c NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES 
BalanceSheetd NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES 
         
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅2 0.00 -0.00 0.15 0.04 0.28 0.13 0.76 0.63 
Observations 2630 2630 2560 2560 2560 2560 2469 2469 
Notes: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the 2007 share of stocks in total 
assets in odd-numbered columns, and the share of safe financial assets in total assets in even-numbered columns. The 
first control variable is the 2009 share of actively managed businesses in total assets. The 2007 values of all other 
variables are used. The sample weights, not population weights, are used in all regressions, and those 2007 business 
owners who actively managed their businesses are excluded. Robust standard errors are adjusted for multiple 
imputation and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
a Demographic and socioeconomic variables: age, age-squared, gender, marital status, log of labor income, tenure, 
unemployment dummy.  
b Risk tolerance and financial sophistication: college graduate and drop-out, full payment of credit card balances, 
financial planning periods, high elicited risk tolerance, average elicited risk tolerance, self-employed head.  
c Measures of credit constraints: an indicator of whether denied full amount of credit or loan in the past five years or 
did not apply since they expected they would be denied, primary residence loan to value ratio, logarithm of total debt 
to assets ratio plus 1.  
d Asset holdings and shares of assets: total assets, total debt, shares of primary residence, commercial real estate, 
business investments and cash in total assets, share of stocks in financial assets.   
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Table 1.3 OLS Regressions of Change in Stocks and Safe Financial Assets 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ΔStocks 
Share 
ΔSafe 
Share 
ΔStocks 
Share 
ΔSafe 
Share 
ΔStocks 
Share 
ΔSafe 
Share 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Business Share -0.133*** -0.190*** -0.140*** -0.203*** -0.141*** -0.210*** 
 (0.033) (0.041) (0.037) (0.048) (0.038) (0.048) 
Average Risk Att.   0.021*** -0.007 0.020*** -0.008 
   (0.007) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) 
High Risk Att.   0.032*** -0.009 0.031*** -0.009 
   (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.014) 
Log(Assets+1)   0.009*** -0.004 0.008** -0.004 
   (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
Log(Debt+1)   -0.003*** -0.000 -0.003*** 0.000 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Stocks/Fin.   -0.009 0.055*** -0.012 0.056*** 
   (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) 
Business Inv.   -0.030 -0.062 -0.028 -0.060 
   (0.051) (0.076) (0.051) (0.077) 
       
       
Demog&Socio.a YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Risk&Sophis.b NO NO YES YES YES YES 
CredConstraint c NO NO YES YES YES YES 
BalanceSheetd NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Ind&Occ&Healthe NO NO NO NO YES YES 
       
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅2 0.26 0.22 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.28 
Observations 2560 2560 2469 2469 2469 2469 
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the share of stocks (in total assets) in odd-numbered columns, and the 
share of safe financial assets (in total assets) in even-numbered columns. The first control variable is the 2009 share 
of actively managed businesses in total assets. We use the 2007 values of all other variables. The sample weights, 
rather than population weights, are used in all regressions, and those 2007 business owners who actively managed 
their businesses are excluded. Robust standard errors are adjusted for multiple imputation and presented in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
a Demographic and socioeconomic variables: age, age-squared, gender, marital status, log of labor income, tenure, 
unemployment dummy.  
b Risk tolerance and financial sophistication: college graduate and drop-out, full payment of credit card balances, 
financial planning periods, high elicited risk tolerance, average elicited risk tolerance, self-employed head.  
c Measures of credit constraints: an indicator of whether denied full amount of credit or loan in the past five years or 
did not apply since they expected they would be denied, primary residence loan to value ratio, logarithm of total debt 
to assets ratio plus 1.  
d Asset holdings and shares of assets: total assets, total debt, shares of primary residence, commercial real estate, 
business investments and cash in total assets, share of stocks in financial assets. 
e Additional controls: indicators for how much the household shopped for investment (high, moderate; low is omitted) 
and borrowing (high, moderate; low is omitted), four indicators for health status (excellent, good, fair, with poor 
omitted), 6 occupation and 7 industry indicators. 
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Table 1.4 2SLS Regressions of Change in the Share of Stocks 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Panel A. First Stage 
     
Business Inv. 07 0.181** 0.179** 0.174** 0.173** 
 (0.076) (0.076) (0.078) (0.078) 
Self-Employed 07 0.023** 0.023** 0.022* 0.021* 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
Past Self-Emp. 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 
     
Panel B. Second Stage 
Business Share -0.098 -0.304 -0.672** -0.644* 
 (0.230) (0.247) (0.329) (0.329) 
Average Risk  0.023*** 0.021*** 0.020** 
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
risk_high07  0.029*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Log(Assets+1)   0.010*** 0.010*** 
   (0.004) (0.004) 
Log(Debt+1)   -0.003*** -0.003*** 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
Stocks/Fin.   -0.007 -0.011 
   (0.019) (0.019) 
     
Demog&Socio.a YES YES YES YES 
Risk&Sophis.b NO YES YES YES 
CredConstraint c NO YES YES YES 
BalanceSheetd NO NO YES YES 
Ind&Occ&Healthe NO NO NO YES 
     
Observations 2560 2560 2469 2469 
Notes: This table reports the results of 2SLS regressions, where the dependent variable is the change in the share of 
stocks in total assets from 2007 to 2009. The endogenous variables is the 2009 share of actively managed businesses 
in total assets, and instrumental variables are (non-actively managed) business investment share in 2007, an indicator 
for 2007 self-employment, and another indicator for past experience of self-employment in 2007 (We only observe 
this variable if previous employment for this job was greater than 3 years and previous employer was different). Panel 
A shows the first stage coefficients for the instrumental variables. Panel B reports the second stage results. The first 
control variable in Panel B is the 2009 share of actively managed businesses in total assets. We use the 2007 values of 
all other variables. The sample weights, rather than population weights, are used in all regressions, and those 2007 
business owners who actively managed their businesses are excluded. Robust standard errors are adjusted for multiple 
imputation and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
a Demographic and socioeconomic variables: age, age-squared, gender, marital status, log of labor income, tenure, 
unemployment dummy.  
b Risk tolerance and financial sophistication measures: college graduate and drop-out, full payment of credit card 
balances, financial planning periods, high elicited risk tolerance, average elicited risk tolerance, self-employed head.  
c Measures of credit constraints: an indicator of whether denied full amount of credit or loan in the past five years or 
did not apply since they expected they would be denied, primary residence loan to value ratio, logarithm of total debt 
to assets ratio plus 1.  
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d Asset holdings and shares of assets: total assets, total debt, shares of primary residence, commercial real estate, 
business investments and cash in total assets, share of stocks in financial assets. 
e Additional controls: indicators for how much the household shopped for investment (high, moderate; low is omitted) 
and borrowing (high, moderate; low is omitted), four indicators for health status (excellent, good, fair, with poor 
omitted), 6 occupation and 7 industry indicators. 
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Table 1.5 Robustness of 2SLS Estimates 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Stocks No 
PM 
Stocks, 
<0.02 
Stocks, 
<0.1 
Stocks, SE 
ME 
Non-Cash 
Fin 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Bus. Share -1.071* -0.921** -1.467** -0.980** -0.873* 
   (0.606) (0.451) (0.651) (0.403) (0.477) 
      
Avg. Risk 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.021** 0.023*** 0.026** 
   (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) 
High Risk 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.034*** 0.031*** 0.031** 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.011) (0.009) (0.015) 
Log(Asset+1)  0.010** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.021*** 
   (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) 
Log(Debt+1) -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.002* 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Stocks/ Fin. -0.011 -0.012 -0.015 -0.009 0.052*** 
  (0.019) (0.02) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) 
      
Notes: This table reports the results of 2SLS regressions. In Columns 1 – 4, the dependent variable is the change in 
the share of stocks (in total assets) from 2007 to 2009. In Columns 5, the dependent variable is the share of non-cash 
financial assets in total assets, where cash is defined as money in the checking and saving accounts, call account, and 
money market accounts. In Column 1, we exclude those who were past managers in 2007, i.e. had been actively 
involved in management of their 2007 business investment. Columns 2 show the results of regressions when we 
exclude those with 2007 shares of business investment greater than 0.02, and Columns 3 show the results when we 
exclude those with 2007 business investment of greater than 0.1. Columns 4 show the robustness to excluding those 
who became business owners in 2009 but did not regarded themselves as self-employed. In Column 5, we use an 
alternative definitions for risky assets, without putting any restriction on the baseline sample.  
The first control variable is the 2009 share of actively managed businesses in total assets. We use the 2007 values of 
all other variables, which include various controls for demographic and socioeconomic variables, risk tolerance and 
financial sophistication, credit constraints, asset holdings and share of assets. See footnotes (a) – (d) of Table 3 for the 
details of what the control variables are. The sample weights, rather than population weights, are used in all 
regressions, and those 2007 business owners who actively managed their businesses are excluded. Robust standard 
errors are adjusted for multiple imputation and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.6 Housing Preprogram Regressions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Housing 
Share 07 
Housing 
Share 07 
Housing 
Share 07 
Housing 
Share 07 
Housing 
Share 07 
Housing 
Share 07 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Bus Share -0.121 -0.043 0.031    
   (0.106) (0.093) (0.069)    
Sold Home    0.219*** 0.053 0.024 
    (0.029) (0.042) (0.027) 
       
Demog&Socio.a YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Risk&Sophis.b NO YES YES NO YES YES 
CredConstraint c NO YES YES NO YES YES 
BalanceSheetd NO NO YES NO NO YES 
       
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅2 0.05 0.37 0.61 0.07 0.37 0.62 
Observations 2560 2560 2469 2586 2586 2487 
Notes: This table reports the results of OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is the 2007 share of primary 
housing in total assets. The first control variable is the 2009 share of actively managed businesses in total assets. Sold 
Home is an indicator which equals 1 if the household had sold their 2007 unit of primary housing in 2009. The 2007 
values of all other variables are used. The sample weights, rather than population weights, are used in all regressions, 
and those 2007 business owners who actively managed their businesses are excluded. Robust standard errors are 
adjusted for multiple imputation and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
a Demographic and socioeconomic variables: age, age-squared, gender, marital status, log of labor income, tenure, 
unemployment dummy.  
b Risk tolerance and financial sophistication: college graduate and drop-out, full payment of credit card balances, financial planning 
periods, high elicited risk tolerance, average elicited risk tolerance, self-employed head.  
c Measures of credit constraints: an indicator of whether denied full amount of credit or loan in the past five years or 
did not apply since they expected they would be denied, primary residence loan to value ratio, logarithm of total debt 
to assets ratio plus 1.  
d Asset holdings and shares of assets: total assets, total debt, shares of primary residence, commercial real estate, 
business investments and cash in total assets, share of stocks in financial assets.  
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Table 1.7 Relationship between Change in the Share of Primary Residence and 2009 Business Share 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ΔHome 
Share 
ΔHome 
Share 
ΔHome 
Share 
ΔHome 
Share 
ΔHome 
Share 
ΔHome 
Share 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Business Share -0.442***  -0.439***  -0.424***  
 (0.080)  (0.083)  (0.082)  
       
SoldHome=0 × Bus 
Share 
 -0.357***  -0.357***  -0.348*** 
 (0.066)  (0.074)  (0.073) 
       
SoldHome=1 × Bus 
Share  
 -1.094***  -1.043***  -0.994*** 
 (0.126)  (0.119)  (0.109) 
       
Demog&Socio.a YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Risk&Sophis.b NO NO YES YES YES YES 
CredConstraint c NO NO YES YES YES YES 
BalanceSheetd NO NO NO NO YES YES 
       
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅2 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 
Observations 2560 2560 2469 2469 2469 2469 
Notes: This table reports the results of OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is the change in the share of 
primary housing in total assets, from 2007 to 2009. The first reported control variable is the 2009 share of actively 
managed businesses in total assets. Sold Home is an indicator which equals 1 if the household had sold their 2007 unit 
of primary housing in 2009. The 2007 values of all other variables are used. The sample weights, rather than population 
weights, are used in all regressions, and those 2007 business owners who actively managed their businesses are 
excluded. Robust standard errors are adjusted for multiple imputation and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
a Demographic and socioeconomic variables: age, age-squared, gender, marital status, log of labor income, tenure, 
unemployment dummy.  
b Risk tolerance and financial sophistication: college graduate and drop-out, full payment of credit card balances, 
financial planning periods, high elicited risk tolerance, average elicited risk tolerance, self-employed head.  
c Measures of credit constraints: an indicator of whether denied full amount of credit or loan in the past five years or 
did not apply since they expected they would be denied, primary residence loan to value ratio, logarithm of total debt 
to assets ratio plus 1.  
d Asset holdings and shares of assets: total assets, total debt, shares of primary residence, commercial real estate, 
business investments and cash in total assets, share of stocks in financial assets. 
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Table 1.8 Probit Regressions of Selling Primary Residence 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Coeff. Marg. 
Effect 
Coeff. Marg. 
Effect 
Coeff. Marg. 
Effect 
Coeff. Marg. 
Effect 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
         
Became  0.417** 0.045** 0.425** 0.044** 0.348* 0.035* 0.322* 0.031* 
Owner (0.179) (0.019) (0.181) (0.019) (0.188) (0.019) (0.190) (0.019) 
         
Demog&Socio.a YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Risk&Sophis.b NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
CredConstraint c NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
BalanceSheetd NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
IndOccHealthe NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES 
         
Observations 1813 1813 1813 1813 1785 1785 1785 1785 
Notes: This table reports the results of probit regressions, where the dependent variable is an indicator of whether the 
household had sold their 2007 primary housing in 2009. Odd-numbered columns display estimated probit coefficients 
and even-numbered columns display average marginal effects. The control variable “Became Owner” is an indicator 
of whether the household became an owner of a business who actively managed it. The 2007 values of all other 
variables are used. The sample weights, rather than population weights, are used in all regressions. We restrict the 
sample to those who had nonzero primary housing assets in 2007. Those 2007 business owners who actively managed 
their businesses are also excluded. Robust standard errors are adjusted for multiple imputation and presented in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
a Demographic and socioeconomic variables: age, age-squared, gender, marital status, log of labor income, tenure, 
unemployment dummy.  
b Risk tolerance and financial sophistication: college graduate and drop-out, full payment of credit card balances, 
financial planning periods, high elicited risk tolerance, average elicited risk tolerance, self-employed head.  
c Measures of credit constraints: an indicator of whether denied full amount of credit or loan in the past five years or 
did not apply since they expected they would be denied, primary residence loan to value ratio, logarithm of total debt 
to assets ratio plus 1.  
d Asset holdings and shares of assets: total assets, total debt, shares of primary residence, commercial real estate, 
business investments and cash in total assets, share of stocks in financial assets. 
e Additional controls: indicators for how much the household shopped for investment (high, moderate; low is omitted) 
and borrowing (high, moderate; low is omitted), four indicators for health status (excellent, good, fair, with poor 
omitted), 6 occupation and 7 industry indicators. 
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1.7.2 Discussion of 2SLS Regressions   
In this section, we present evidence that use of IV for safe financial assets does not change our 
general conclusions. Table 1.9 shows the results for 2SLS regression of safe financial assets for 
the same specifications that we used for the share of stocks. To simplify comparison, we put the 
previously estimated results for stocks share beside the ones for safe financial assets for each 
specification. In all specifications, the effect of business share on safe financial asset holdings is 
not statistically different from zero. Moreover, the decline in stocks share is larger than the 
decline in safe financial assets for different sets of control variables, which is in line with our 
conclusion of diversification response of entrants to the background risk.  
In Table 1.10, we report how the 2SLS regression results for safe financial assets are robust to 
alternative specifications. Similar to what we found in Table 1.9, changes in safe financial assets 
are estimated imprecisely, all insignificant at the 10% level. The corresponding estimated decline 
for stocks share (represented in Table 1.5), which is more precisely estimated, is larger in all five 
specifications, consistent with the diversification response to background risk from businesses. 
Also note that in all specifications, the estimated coefficients for the change in asset shares are 
larger in absolute value compared to our preferred specification (Column 3 of Table 1.4).   
Column 1 of Table 1.10 shows the estimate when we exclude those who used to be actively 
involved in the management of their 2007 business investment. Columns 2 shows the results of 
regressions when we exclude those with shares of  2007 business investment greater than 0.02, 
and Columns 3 demonstrates the coefficient when we exclude those with 2007 business 
investment of greater than 0.1. Our findings remain qualitatively robust. The discrepancy 
between the estimated coefficients for safe and risky assets decrease when we exclude those with 
share of investment greater than 0.02; however, the change in stocks, which is fairly precisely 
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estimated, becomes larger, indicating a greater substitution between public and private equity. As 
column 3 demonstrates, when we put a less stringent condition (compared to column 2) on 2007 
business investment, the estimations provide a very clear picture of higher change in 
stockholdings compared to safe financial assets. For each one pp. rise in the share of actively 
managed businesses, the estimations indicate nearly 1.5 pp. decline in stocks share, with almost 
no change in safe financial share.  
Column 4 shows the robustness to excluding those who became business owners 2007 without 
reporting self-employment. While the estimation results indicated an almost one to one 
substitution between the share of private and public equity, the estimated coefficient for safe 
financial assets is almost one fourth and not statistically different from zero.  
In the last column, we use alternative definitions for safe and risky assets, where stocks and 
bonds are regarded as risky financial assets and cash as the safe financial asset. Using the 
alternative definitions, Column 5 shows almost no change in the share of cash. 
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Table 1.9 2SLS Regressions for the Share of Stocks and Safe Financial Assets 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Δ Stocks 
Share 
Δ Safe 
Share 
Δ Stocks 
Share 
Δ Safe 
Share 
Δ Stocks 
Share 
Δ Safe 
Share 
Δ Stocks 
Share 
Δ Safe 
Share 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Business Share -0.098 0.279 -0.304 0.069 -0.672** -0.375 -0.644* -0.367 
 (0.230) (0.342) (0.247) (0.331) (0.329) (0.374) (0.329) (0.375) 
         
Demog&Socio.a YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Risk&Sophis.b NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
CredConstraint c NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
BalanceSheetd NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Ind&Occ&Healthe NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES 
         
N 2560 2560 2560 2560 2469 2469 2469 2469 
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the share of stocks (in total assets) in odd-numbered columns, and the 
share of safe financial assets (in total assets) in even-numbered columns. The reported control variable is the 2009 
share of actively managed businesses in total assets. We use the 2007 values of all other variables. Sample weights, 
rather than population weights, are used in all regressions, and those 2007 business owners who actively managed 
their businesses are excluded. Robust standard errors are adjusted for multiple imputation and presented in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
a Demographic and socioeconomic variables: age, age-squared, gender, marital status, log of labor income, tenure, 
unemployment dummy.  
b Risk tolerance and financial sophistication measures: college graduate and drop-out, full payment of credit card 
balances, financial planning periods, high elicited risk tolerance, average elicited risk tolerance, self-employed head.  
c Measures of credit constraints: an indicator of whether denied full amount of credit or loan in the past five years or 
did not apply since they expected they would be denied, primary residence loan to value ratio, logarithm of total debt 
to assets ratio plus 1.  
d Asset holdings and shares of assets: total assets, total debt, shares of primary residence, commercial real estate, 
business investments and cash in total assets, share of stocks in financial assets. 
e Additional controls: indicators for how much the household shopped for investment (high, moderate; low is omitted) 
and borrowing (high, moderate; low is omitted), four indicators for health status (excellent, good, fair, with poor 
omitted), 6 occupation and 7 industry indicators. 
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Table 1.10 Robustness of 2SLS Estimates 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Safe No PM Safe, <0.02 Safe, <0.1 Safe, SE 
ME 
Cash Share 
Bus Share -0.458 -0.688 0.015 -0.254 -0.028 
   (0.532) (0.52) (0.65) (0.458) (0.19) 
      
Avg. Risk -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.013 
   (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) 
High Risk -0.006 -0.007 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 
   (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.01) 
Log(Asset+1)  -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.017*** 
   (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Log(Debt+1) 0 0 0 -0.000 0 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Stocks/ Fin. 0.053** 0.051** 0.055*** 0.055*** -0.002 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.011) 
      
Notes: This table reports the results of 2SLS regressions for alternative specifications. In columns 1, 3, 5 and 7, the 
dependent variable is the change in the share of stocks (in total assets) from 2007 to 2009. In columns 2, 4, 6 and 8, 
the dependent variable is the change in the share of safe financial assets (in total assets) from 2007 to 2009. The 
dependent variables in columns 9 are the share of cash in total assets and the share of non-cash financial assets in total 
assets, respectively. Cash is defined as money in checking and saving accounts, call accounts and money market 
accounts. Column 1 and 2 show the results when we exclude those who were actively involved in management of 
their business investment in the past. In Columns 3 and 4, we exclude those with shares of business investment greater 
than 0.02, and in Columns 5 and 6 we exclude those with 2007 business investment of greater than 0.1. Columns 7 
and 8 exclude those who became business owners, but were not self-employed in 2009. The last two columns present 
results with our baseline sample, but using alternative definitions for safe and risky assets. 
The first reported control variable is the 2009 share of actively managed businesses in total assets. We use the 2007 
values of all other variables, which include various controls for demographic and socioeconomic variables, risk 
tolerance and financial sophistication, credit constraints, asset holdings and share of assets. See footnotes (a) – (d) of 
Table 1.9 for the details of what the control variables are. The sample weights, rather than population weights, are 
used in all regressions, and those 2007 business owners who actively managed their businesses are excluded. Robust 
standard errors are adjusted for multiple imputation and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Chapter 2: Who Are Angel Investors? 
2.1 Introduction 
Both academics and the popular press have focused on venture capital (VC) as one of the 
primary drivers of innovation over the past 25 years.  This is not surprising, given the growth in 
venture capital investment over this period on the one hand and the significance of venture 
capital cycles on the other.1  However, despite the attention paid to venture capital, the vast 
majority of start-ups do not receive their initial funding from institutional VCs, who tend to focus 
on expansion or later stage financing.  Most entrepreneurs initially fund their firms using their 
own savings and the investment made by informal private investors, or “angels.”  For example, 
using National Survey of Small Business Finances data, Fenn and Liang (1998) indicate that for 
each firm that raised venture capital financing from new investors, six firms raised it from angel 
investors.2  Due to the informal nature of the angel investing market, much less is known about 
the trends and activities in this market when compared to the substantial amount of research on 
institutional venture capital.  
This paper investigates the determinants of angel investing behavior, and examines whether the 
trends observed in the formal venture capital are also found in the informal angel investment 
market.  In particular, we analyze the role of angel investment in the allocation of the portfolios 
of households and highlight the differences in angel investing behavior of wealthy and non-
                                                 
1 The venture capital cycle during this period was marked by booms and the bust induced by the dot-com bubble, 
followed later by the “Great Recession.” Venture capital investments increased from approximately $4.2 billion in 
1994 to $26.7 billion in 2012, peaking at $105.2 billion in 2000 (National Venture Capital Yearbook, 2013). 
2 They also report that approximately one-third of firms going public had been financed by venture capitalists and 
two-thirds by informal investors (angel investors in our study). They conclude that there must be at least twice as 
many firms that receive private equity other than venture capital. 
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wealthy households. Moreover, we explore how angel investing interacts with other risky 
holdings, and discuss the implications of our findings for what motivates angel investment and 
how sophisticated angels are.  
A main contribution of the current work is to provide a broad picture of angel investors, derived 
from a representative sample. Hence, it can provide information relevant to the extent of need for 
financial protection regulations in the equity private investment market, which has received 
much attention since the removal of some equity crowdfunding barriers for unaccredited 
investors in JOBS Act. Little is known currently about unaccredited investors. The current 
studies on angel investment generally focus on highly selected subpopulations of these individual 
private investors, who tend to affluent, financially sophisticated, and members of angel groups.3 
On the policy side, the rise of online equity crowdfunding platform has raised questions about 
the role of SEC in balancing its twin goals of raising capital and investor protection (Ibrahim 
2015). In recent years, the debate has come to attention because of JOBS Act Titles II and III 
legislations easing the access to equity crowdfunding from accredited and unaccredited investors, 
respectively (See for example Heminway 2013; Mashburn 2013; Stemler 2015; Hornuf and 
Schwienbacher 2016). Less strict solicitation requirement for accredited angel investors seems to 
have proven successful in online platforms such as AngelList and FoundersClub (Ibrahim 2015). 
However, there have been rising concerns about protecting non-accredited individual private 
investors in equity crowdfunding platforms, e.g. through stricter disclosure requirements (Hazen 
                                                 
3 Kerr, Lerner, and Schoar (2014) study two successful angel groups. Bernstein, Korteweg and Laws (2015) use data 
from the online angel investing platform AngelList, which is restricted to accredited investor. Venugopal and 
Yerramilli (2016) also use AngelList database as part of their data construction. Data on startups has also been used, 
but the data tends to be more representative of high-tech and growth-oriented firms, which are presumably more 
likely to attract sophisticated angels. Goldfarb et al (2013) use data from a prominent law firm, whose clients 
represent a small slice of angels. Croce, Guerini and Ughetto (2016) focus on high-tech startups from Crunchbase.    
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2012). The debate about balancing availability of capital and investor protection has also 
received attention following the requirement by Dodd-Frank Act4 that SEC re-examine the 
definition of accredited investor every four years. 
Furthermore, our study of angel investment made by average households in the economy has 
important implications for small businesses and business ownership of the typical households 
and, as argued by Quadrini (1999, 2000), for their socioeconomic mobility. 
While our representative sample could have important policy and regulatory implications for 
investor protection, we also investigate the characteristics of angel investors in the selected 
sample of those who are in the top 1% in term of their net worth (henceforth we may call them 
the 1% or simply the wealthy). This helps us focus on a comparatively homogeneous subset of 
angels who provide the majority of angel investment in the economy. Furthermore, the top 1% 
hold more than two-thirds of angel investment equity, hence they have a disproportionate effect 
on the aggregate trends. Finally, the top 1% sample makes our results more comparable to the 
current studies which are mostly focused on wealthy angels.  
Using the data on these wealthy households, as well as a representative sample of the US 
economy, we attempt to address a set of questions that include: (a) What are the characteristics 
of angel investors in terms of wealth, risk taking and financial discipline?  (b) How is angel 
investment equity related to other asset holding? (c) Are there changes in angel investment 
activity similar to the trends and cycles found in the VC market? (d) Are there differences in 
angel investing behavior between the wealthy and non-wealthy?  
                                                 
4 See section 413(b)(2)(A) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. 
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Previous empirical research on angel investors has been hampered by limitations of data. Some 
studies consist of small surveys of angel investors in specific locales (Prowse 1998; Hellman et 
al 2013) or small parts of the angel community (Kerr, Lerner and Schoar 2012; Goldfarb et al. 
2013), making it virtually impossible to generalize to the economy as a whole.  
Other studies use samples of start-ups to determine the amount of angel financing these firms 
received (e.g., Wong 2010; Hellman et al. 2013).  While this approach provides some insight into 
issues such as the amount of angel investment and the type of contracts, it provides little insight 
concerning the determinants of the decision of whether to make an angel investment or how 
much of the household’s portfolio should be allocated to this type of asset.  
Answering questions (a)-(d) above requires a large scale survey including a representative 
sample of high net worth households with detailed information on their portfolio holdings.  The 
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) is an ideal data set in this regard, particularly because it 
contains detailed portfolio data for a large subsample of wealthy households. In addition, 
because the survey was conducted in repeated cross-sections, we can investigate whether the 
trends in angel investing match those found in the formal venture capital market. The follow-up 
panel of the 2007 cross-sectional data in 2009 also allows us to investigate entry and exit from 
angel investment.  Although the SCF short panel and cross-sectional data do not allow following 
the same individuals through different stages of life cycle, we are still able to examine how angel 
investing behavior changes with the age of the household head.  
Our findings using the 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, and 2010 waves of the SCF yield some 
interesting results.  Most notably, we find an upward trend in the fraction of top 1% net worth 
households with an angel investment in their portfolio, where the rise is unaffected by the 
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financial crisis. This fraction goes from 13% in 1998 up to 22% in 2010. In contrast, ownership 
of actively managed businesses and risky financial assets among the top 1% rose modestly or 
declined over the same period. Multivariate probit estimates show that the rise in angel equity 
ownership among the top 1% during this period is significant at 10% level after accounting for 
changes in demographic and wealth characteristics. The rising fraction of the wealthy households 
who make angel investment appears to coincide with a decrease in the fraction of them holding 
risky financial assets, such as public equity. 
We also find that in spite of the dramatic cycles in VC funding, angel investment participation 
and equity has been subject to much smaller fluctuations, making it a consistent source of 
funding in both good and bad times. This suggests that angel investing is less prone to some of 
the limitations of venture capital financing, most notably the seemingly inevitable boom-bust 
cycle in venture capital financing (Lerner 2012).5 
Consistent with these summary statistics, we find a generally positive association between self-
employment and angel equity ownership after controlling for observable variables. We also find 
that angel investment is increasing in wealth for both the wealthy and the full sample. The 
measure of wealth we use for our cross section data is net worth, where in our panel analysis we 
delve further into the effect of wealth by differentiating between financial and non-financial net 
worth. Age is more strongly associated with being an angel for non-wealthy households, where 
subjective preferences for risk appear to be more important for the top 1%. We find robust 
evidence that wealthy households with higher subjective preference for risk are more likely to 
                                                 
5 Denoting the virtues of venture capital, Lerner (2012) points out four essential constraints for it: limited scope, 
boom-bust cycles, vulnerability to mercurial public markets and uneasy oversight. In addition to being less subject 
to boom and bust, angel investing is less vulnerable to the public market pressure resulted by the nature of 
governance in venture capital firms.   
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make angel investments or have more angel equity. However, the results for the effect of risk 
attitudes on angel investment made by the non-wealthy are inconclusive, where the cross section 
association disappears in our panel data analysis. 
The panel enables us to explore further into causality for the variables affecting angel 
investment, and enables us to consider how becoming an angel is related to previous portfolio 
holdings. Our panel findings are consistent with the notion that angel investors are more 
financially disciplined, as measured by the amount of effort before making financial decisions 
and their credit card balances. Although the occurrence of the financial crisis in the period of the 
panel may affect the generalizability of our results, the consistency between the cross section and 
panel results seems reassuring.  
Section 2 discusses the theories that might improve our understanding of angel investment. In 
Section 3, we describe the data and provide summary statistics. In Section 4, we present the 
econometric framework. Sections 5 and 6 present results using the cross-sectional and panel 
data, respectively. Section 7 concludes. 
2.2 Theoretical Background 
The theoretical literature on angel investing remains fairly underdeveloped and the existing 
studies focus on the most innovative companies with high growth potential, i.e. the type of 
companies that institutional venture capitalists are also interested in. Casamatta (2003) and 
Schwienbacher (2009) provide rationales for why a firm might receive angel investment even 
when they could self-finance and use consulting services (Casamatta 2003), or when they have 
access to less financially constrained venture capitalists who are more likely to make follow up 
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investment (Schwienbacher 2009). Testing the empirical predictions of these models requires 
data on the firms and their VC investors, which is not available in the SCF. 
Chemmanur and Chen (2014) develop a theory where angels make business investments even 
though they assume they cannot add value to the business. While this assumption is not 
consistent with the evidence that the most successful angel investors add value to businesses 
(Kerr et al 2012), their model predicts the involvement of angels in earlier stages compared to 
VCs and implies investment in small amounts in many firms. While we do not observe when 
angel investments are made, we will look at the number of angel investments that households 
hold in their portfolios in our representative and 1% samples.  
While there has been little theoretical modeling of angel investing, research on portfolio choice 
provides insight into the decision to provide angel capital.  Heaton and Lucas (2001) calibrate 
that a private equity premium of 10% would make an individual indifferent between investments 
in a private firm versus public equity for reasonable parameter values.  Carroll (2000) notes that 
the rich hold a substantial portion of their assets in the form of business equity, but the rest of the 
population does not, which is difficult to explain using standard portfolio choice models 
assuming constant relative risk aversion utility functions.  An alternative explanation may be that 
there are imperfections in capital markets, such as information and transaction costs, which 
imply both a large minimum scale of business equity investment and higher returns (Gentry and 
Hubbard 1998; Quadrini 1999)6.  Consequently, the rich are likely to have portfolios with larger 
                                                 
6 Information costs are especially interesting, however, due to their implications for SEC’s implementation of JOBS 
Act’s Title III, that allow equity crowdfunding from unaccredited investors. If the reason for the relationship 
between wealth and angel investment is that the non-wealthy are uninformed about such opportunities, the SEC 
rulings could serve as an informational shock which would imply a rise in angel investment among non-accredited 
investors. SEC rules became effective on May 16, 2016, when unaccredited individuals could start to invest through 
an equity crowdfunding website. 
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components of business equity and angel investments.  However, Moskowitz and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2002) describe a private equity premium puzzle:  Despite much higher risk, the 
average return to private equity is similar to that of public equity. Hence, capital market 
imperfections may not be able to explain the large business equity holdings of the wealthy 
households. 
Other explanations for angel investment activity include heterogeneity in preferences, 
particularly a difference in risk preferences of angels and non-angels, although one would expect 
that angel investment should generate higher returns to compensate for higher risk relative to 
public equity.  Building on the arguments of Hamilton (2000), Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen 
(2002) suggest that there may be non-pecuniary benefits of private equity holding. Wealthier 
households may be more willing to “purchase” these benefits by making angel investments. We 
could test the implications of heterogeneity in risk preferences by seeing the differences in 
attitudes towards risk between angels and non-angels. However, lack of heterogeneity in risk 
preference might imply a role for non-pecuniary benefits from angel investment.  
Wong (2010) emphasizes agency costs associated with angel investing, arguing that geographic 
proximity of the angel to the entrepreneur enables monitoring that may substitute for more 
formal control mechanism. The lower protection rights of angel investors in investment contracts 
may be as well due to higher screening abilities of angels, e.g. through prior experience in the 
industry. However, it is quite difficult to measure and examine the amount of specialized 
information and ability of the investors.  But the data allows us to observe whether the angel 
investors are entrepreneurs, as a rough measure of familiarity with the workings of the business. 
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Hence, positive association between entrepreneurial status and angel investment would be 
consistent with the importance of agency costs.7  
However, the relationship between self-employment and angel investment could also be 
negative. The background risk from privately held businesses (Heaton and Lucas 2000a, 2000b) 
may make angel investment less desirable for entrepreneurs. Therefore, the direction of the 
relationship between self-employment and angel investment could shed light on the relative 
importance of information asymmetries and background risk for angel investment decision.  
2.3 Data and Initial Evidence 
Investigation of the determinants of angel investing behavior requires data on angels and non-
angels alike.  Moreover, given that angels are generally drawn from the wealthy, we require a 
sizable sample of high net worth households.  The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) collects 
information on the portfolios of a random sample of American households.  Respondents are 
asked to provide information on financial assets, such as checking accounts, mutual funds, and 
public equity, as well as housing, business, and real estate equity.  The SCF also includes an 
additional and sizable subsample of wealthy households.  This paper utilizes the SCF cross-
sectional surveys conducted in 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010 and the SCF 2007-2009 panel 
data.  We will estimate separate estimations for the representative sample, as well as a sample of 
the top 1%.  
                                                 
7 Such a positive association could also be driven by higher access of entrepreneurs to information about angel 
investment opportunities. This will be less of an issue in our sample of 1%, who are likely to be more informed 
about such opportunities. 
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2.3.1 Why Also Focus on the 1%?   
The focus on high net worth provides us with a relatively homogeneous sample of angel 
investors. In other words, by focusing on the top 1% we restrict the sample to angel investors 
who are likely to be more knowledgeable about private businesses and more homogeneous in 
terms of the businesses they invest in.  80% of the top 1% either own an actively managed 
businesses or have managerial or professional occupations. Therefore, we expect them to be a 
relatively informed population regarding investing in private companies.8 Even the remaining 
20% of the wealthy are likely to be relatively informed, at least about available investment 
opportunities, through their networks or entrepreneurs who may contact them to pitch for an 
angel investment. 
The level of information of the top 1% enables us to view the participation in angel investing 
more as a decision made by the angel investors given the availability of information, rather than 
mostly determined by the information about investment opportunities or lack thereof9. Hence, 
the top 1% sample alleviates the concern for the omitted variable bias resulting from the lack of 
accurate data on how informed households are about investment opportunities. In contrast, the 
determinants of participation among the 99% could simply reflect access to information about 
angel investment opportunities. For example, we may find that entrepreneurs are more likely to 
be angel investors only because they are likely to know other entrepreneurs who need angel 
                                                 
8 The majority of the top 1% are entrepreneurs, where nearly two-thirds of them own at least one business for which 
they are actively involved in management. Among the remaining one-third who are not business owners, 44% have 
managerial or professional occupations. We count an individual as having managerial or professional occupation if 
his occupation is among management, business, financial operations, professional and related occupations. Ideally, 
we would have considered managerial and maybe some professional occupations, but the Survey of Consumer 
Finances public data, which is the main data source for the current paper, does not provide further classification of 
occupation classes. 
9 Ideally, we would be interested in modeling angel investment as a matching process between entrepreneurs and 
angel investors. However, we do not observe the supply side of angel investment market in our data.  
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investment. Therefore, entrepreneurial status would pick up the effect of access to investment 
opportunities, which is unobserved. 
The 1% sample is also likely to be more homogeneous in terms of the type of businesses angels 
invest in, which is likely to involve startups with high potential for growth. The top 1% are less 
likely to face constraints in the amount of angel investment they are willing to provide, and are 
hence more likely to provide funding to businesses with higher capital requirements. High net 
worth enables these wealthy households to optimally diversify their portfolios while making a 
potentially large investment in a risky project. On the other hand, one might expect the top 1% to 
be more likely to invest in businesses involving high risk and high returns, e.g. rapidly growing 
firms such as high technology startups. These firms usually need either VCs or wealthy angel 
investors with pockets deep enough to compensate for their lack of tangible assets and cash flow 
on the one hand and diversify the risk from private equity investment on the other. 
The top 1% are also accredited investors, which facilitates their engagement in angel investment 
activity. SEC Rule 501 of Regulation D defines an “accredited” angel investor as an individual 
or household with net worth of more than $1 million or annual earnings of $200,000 ($300,000 
for household).  Investors’ accreditation exempts companies and investors from regulatory 
barriers intended to protect investors from fraud or excessive risk taking.10  
In our data, 71% of the angel equity belongs to those with net worth among the top 1%.11 Their 
disproportionate impact on the supply of angel investing equity makes studying them crucial for 
understanding the aggregate trends. Having high net worth is frequently considered part of the 
                                                 
10 Examples of these financial regulations are registration requirements, general solicitation prohibitions, and 
investment limits. 
11 The households in other percentiles of net worth become increasingly less influential in determining the aggregate 
angel investment equity. The top 5% and 10% of net worth own 90% and 94% of the angel equity respectively.  
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definition of an angel investor (Kerr et al 2011; Chemmanur and Fulghieri 2014; see also Shane 
2008). Moreover, the top 1% are more likely to include angel investors who are strangers, rather 
than friends and family of the entrepreneur. Some studies restrict the definition of angel investor 
to the informal investors who are strangers (Shane 2008; Wong 2002). We will come back to this 
issue later when we discuss the definition of an angel investor.12 
2.3.2 Identifying Angel Investors   
A key issue is how to define angel investment in the SCF data.  The SCF asks respondents to 
provide information on both actively managed and non-actively managed business holdings.  In 
addition, respondents with non-actively managed business assets are asked if they ever had an 
active management role in any of the non-actively managed businesses.  We define an angel 
investment as an investment in a non-actively managed business in which the individual never 
had an active management role.  While this definition is conservative, we want to distinguish 
angel investment from the case where a business owner has retired or left the business, but still 
holds an equity stake.  These types of individuals do not fit the traditional view of an angel 
investor, who typically takes a passive role in the management of the business.13 Consequently, 
we consider 3 types of private business equity holdings in this paper:  (a) Business Owner; (b) 
Business Investor/Past Manager; (c) Angel Investor.     
                                                 
12 Using the 1% cutoff also works well as a practical consideration. The oversampling of the wealthy in the SCF has 
mostly increased the sample of wealthy in the top 1%. Hence, while considering larger cutoffs of net worth for the 
subsample of the wealthy would help through providing extra data points, it might not be worth the loss in 
homogeneity of the sample (We assume the top 1% are not only more homogenous than the top 5% or 10% in terms 
of wealth, but also in other attributes such as their access to information). For example, increasing the cutoff for 
definition of wealthy all the way from the 1% of net worth to 10% (a tenfold increase in the represented population) 
increases the number of cross-section’s angels by about 39%.  
13 Our definition, however, does not exclude angels who are known as active angels in the literature (Shane 2008). 
Although angel investors do not actively manage the businesses, they can be active investors in the sense that they 
may undertake a deliberate due diligence and be actively involved with the business by coaching entrepreneurs and 
providing them with networks and connections.   
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2.3.3 Angels or Friends and Family?  
There is no general consensus about the definition of an angel investor. People may call a variety 
of private investors as angel investors.14 Shane (2008) restricts angels to those who provide their 
own capital to a private business which is not owned and operated by themselves or their friends 
and family members.15 A main difference between Shane’s definition and the one we use is that 
he makes the distinction between two groups of informal private investors: 1) friends and family 
and 2) strangers.16 
Our data does not allow us to identify friends and family. This makes the angel investors in our 
study, especially the wealthy, similar to angels in Goldfarb et al. (2013)17 in terms of potentially 
including friends and family members. Hellman et al. (2013) exclude the family members to the 
extent that they share the same last name with the business founders. Their method and data does 
not allow them to identify other family members and friends. Among other studies, Kerr, Lerner 
and Schoar (2012) don’t exclude friends and family in their definition,18 where Wong (2010) 
makes the distinction between friends and family and angel investors. 
A potential concern is that lacking information regarding the relationship between the angel 
investor and business owner may bias our results. However, the presumably weaker economic 
incentives of friends and family compared to other investors is likely to strengthen many of our 
findings. Economic rationales for angel investment are likely to be underestimated if friends and 
family pursue other objectives, such as helping kin. For example, family members might not be 
                                                 
14 See Shane (2008) for an extensive overview of the definitions used by different sources. 
15 Shane considers both debt and equity as angel investment. Our study just focuses on equity. 
16 More specifically, he excludes the investment done by relatives, friends, coworkers and neighbors. 
17 A main difference between the angel investors there and in our study is that they also include as angels non-VC 
entities such as universities and governments, where all angels in our study are  
18 They define angel investors as “high-net-worth individuals that make private investments in startup companies 
with their own money”. However, inclusion of friends and family is less of a concern in their study, as they focus on 
the angel investment made by angel groups. 
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as sensitive to riskiness of a business, hence lessen the estimated role of risk tolerance in 
becoming an angel investor.  
On the other hand, Shane (2008) finds evidence that family and friends are not that different 
from others in terms of some characteristics important to angel investing decision. He does not 
find any evidence for a systematic difference between friends and family and other private 
investors in terms of gender, race, education, being retired, business startup experience, being an 
owner-manager of a business, number of informal investment made over the individual’s career, 
and attitudes toward entrepreneurship, own abilities and economic equality.  His findings 
supports the notion that friends and family and other informal private investors constitute a sub-
population with similar characteristics, which we define as angel investors in this study.  
Shane (2008) also points out that many people make investments in businesses owned by friends 
and family, as well as those owned by strangers during their careers, and as a result the same 
attitudes are held by most angels and friends and family investors. Our sample of 1% is 
especially consistent with the idea of people making multiple angel investments. The majority of 
the angels in the top 1% own angel equity in multiple businesses at the time of the survey. 
Among the top 1%, the average number of angel investments is 3.3 and the median angel 
investor holds angel equity in two businesses. Given the relatively high number of angel 
investments per household at the time of survey, it is much likely that at least one of those 
investments is in a stranger’s business, or they had invested in a stranger’s business at some 
point in their career.19 
                                                 
19 Here we consider the number of angel investments as a proxy for not being among friends and family members. It 
does not seem very likely that more that one of the friends or family members is funded at the same time by an 
individual angel, and more so considering the high risks involved with angel investment. Note also that many of 
those with a single angel investment at the time of the survey might also be non-acquaintances.  Hellman, Schure 
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Overall, the exclusion of friends and family from the sample of angel investors may not be as 
important for our purpose of determining their characteristics. This exclusion might be more 
important for other applications, such as evaluating the size of the angel capital in the economy, 
or studying the financing contracts between angels and investors. 
2.3.4 Initial Evidence  
Table 2.1 shows the summary statistics for the sample of 1%, and Table 2.2 represents the 
corresponding statistics for the representative sample of whole population. We start by looking 
the sample of the wealthy who have a disproportionate effect on the total supply of angel 
investment, especially to the growth-oriented businesses who are also more likely to be on the 
demand side of institutional venture capital. 
In contrast to the substantial bust in institutional venture capital funding after 2000, the first row 
of Table 2.1 shows that the percentage of wealthy households with an angel investment in their 
portfolio remained steady or rose slightly starting after 2001. Participation rates has had an 
upward trend during the period, with no clear signs of cyclicality or a relationship to venture 
capital cycles. We see two noticeable increases in the participation rates of the wealthy, one from 
13% in 1998 to 22% in 2001 and the other one form 19% in 2007 to 22% in 2010.20 In the 
former period the venture capital market grew substantially, but in the latter period venture 
                                                 
and Vo (2013) argue that being involved with just one company during the period of their study (1995-2009) 
suggests that the angel investor has limited interest in angel investing and might have made that investment as a 
result of personal connection or other idiosyncratic reasons. Applying similar arguments to the angel investors in the 
top 1% further strengthens our argument. Note that we find the majority of angels in the top 1% involved with 
multiple companies at a snapshot in time versus the 14 years in their study. Hence, even more of the angel investors 
in our study satisfy the condition for being a “committed” angel according to Hellman et al (2013). 
20 A potential concern regarding the trends in the wealthy’s angel investment is that it might be due to the change in 
composition of the top 1%. However, we find that the trends are in general qualitatively robust to restricting 
attention to different cutoffs for defining the wealthy, i.e. the top 5% and 10% of net worth. Moreover, the ratio of 
angel equity owned by the 1% is steady over time, meaning that the relative importance of the top 1% in the 
provision of angel investment doesn’t change much through time. See Appendix A for more details. 
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capital investments and number of deals shrank.21 The rise in angel investment activity from 
2007 to 2010 occurs despite the fact that the distribution of net worth of these households 
appears to have moved to the left. One might expect having less wealth to be associated with 
lower participation in the risky angel investment market.  
The rise in angel investment participation for the wealthy households coincides with increases in 
the holdings of other forms of business equity:  65% of high net worth households owned 
businesses in which they had a current or past active management role in 1998, compared to 71% 
in 2010.  At the same time, holdings of risky financial assets, defined as publicly traded stock, 
non-municipal bonds, the risky portion of mutual funds and life insurance, slightly decreased 
between 1998 and 2010.22    
The remainder of Table 2.1 indicates that the distribution of housing equity has experienced a 
rightward shift between 1998 and 2007 and a shift to the left after the great recession, where the 
median value of risky financial assets has been consistently falling.  Not surprisingly, the heads 
of wealthy households are relatively older, highly educated, and white. Judging by the trends in 
demographic characteristics in Table 2.1, the more recent top 1% household heads are slightly 
older and slightly less likely to have children under 18.  However, it would seem to be difficult to 
argue that the rise in ownership of one or more angel investments solely reflects demographic 
changes. 
Table 2.2 shows smaller changes through time for the population, especially before the Great 
Recession. There is a much lower, but steady, rate of involvement in angel investing for the 
                                                 
21 The venture capital investment rose from 21,490m in 1998 to 40,968m in 2001, where it fell from 31,872m in 
2007 to 23,316m in 2010. The number of deals rose from 3,728 in 1998 to 4,589 in 2001, where it fell from 4,213 in 
2007 to 3,626 in 2010. See Appendix C for a closer comparison of angel investment and institutional venture capital. 
22 The definition of risky financial assets used in this paper follows Carroll (2002). 
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whole population. Unlike the 1% sample, we do not observe large changes in participation, but 
we do observe moderate declines in angel involvement after the 2001 bust and the Great 
Recession. The participation rate peaks at 1.4% in 2001 and becomes lowest at 1.0% in 2010. 
The rate of business ownership is steady through time at about 12%, while holdings of risky 
financial assets did not change much before the crisis and fell afterwards.  The distribution of 
wealth and primary housing moved to the right up to 2007, especially for higher percentiles, but 
moved to the left after the Great Recession. The median value of risky asset holdings is very 
small compared to median net worth; it is negligible before 2004, peaks at 980$ in 2004 and goes 
down until it becomes 0 again in 2010. The household heads tend to be younger, less educated 
and less white compared to the 1%, while similar to the subsample of the wealthy, the more 
recent household heads are slightly older and slightly less likely to have children under 18.  
Table 2.3 summarizes some aspects of the portfolios of angel investors for the top 1% and the 
representative sample.  Panel A focuses on the top 1% and exhibits four notable features of angel 
investors for these wealthy households.  First, the angel investors are highly likely to be business 
owners.23 They comprise the majority of angel investors in the latter years of our data, increasing 
their participation rates from 49% in 1998 to 56% in 2010. Second, angels have high exposures 
to risk. Private equity and risky financial assets comprise a large fraction of their net worth, 
peaking at 71% in 2001 and going down to 56% at 2010. Third, the angel equity shares of 
angels’ portfolios are still relatively small. The median angel equity generally comprises below 
5% of the portfolio of an angel investor. Even the 90th percentile of angel share has consistently 
                                                 
23 This might be also related to the conventional wisdom that angel preferences are more strongly aligned with 
entrepreneurs than with VCs (Goldfarb et al. 2012) Since many angels are entrepreneurs themselves, they might 
share similar preferences or understanding of the workings of the business that would be reflected in their contracts 
with business owners.  
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remained below 50% starting in 2004, while it had been as high as 90% at 2008, possibly due to 
overvaluations at the dot-com era. Fourth, while the number of angel investors increased 
between 1998 and 2010, the average accumulated (self-reported) value of the investments of 
angels appears to have declined, and was especially hit after 2007. Consequently, the increase in 
the incidence of investment may be offset by a reduction in intensity. We will come back to this 
issue when we discuss the regressions.  A look at the distribution of angel equity value shows 
that the decline in average angel share was highest at 75th percentile, indicating that the right tale 
of the distribution has shifted toward left. 
Panel B of Table 2.3 summarizes the same aspects of angels’ portfolios for the whole sample. 
The representative angels are very likely to be business owners and have relatively high exposure 
to risk, but their rate of business ownership and their exposure to private and public equity risk 
are not as high as the 1%. The angel equity shares in the full sample are generally similar to 
those of the 1%, but one should note that lower wealth and fewer number of angel investments 
make the non-wealthy more exposed to an undiversified risk from angel investments. Unlike the 
1% sample, the average angel equity value in the representative sample has risen during the 
period of our study. This has been a result of rising angel equity values at the right tail of the 
distribution, as 75th percentile values of angel equity indicate.  
2.4 Econometric Framework 
Econometric analysis of portfolio data is difficult due to the correlated and censored nature of the 
data.  Unobserved (by the econometrician) household characteristics affecting the decision to 
make an angel investment are likely to be correlated with those affecting the decision to hold 
other assets, such as stocks.  Moreover, households may choose not to hold any assets in 
particular categories. Consequently, analysis of angel investing behavior requires the use of 
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multivariate censored regression models.24 We will estimate a multivariate probit model for our 
cross section data, before moving on to our panel data analysis. 
The empirical investigation of the determinants of angel investment activity faces a number of 
challenges.  First, angel investment holdings are just one component of a household’s portfolio.  
It is unlikely that the characteristics of the household that are available in large scale data sets 
like the SCF are able to fully capture the determinants of asset holdings.  For example, the risk 
preferences of the household or beliefs about the asset returns are generally not easily measured 
or available.  Consequently, unobservables affecting the holdings of each category of assets, such 
as business equity and risky financial assets, are likely to be correlated.  Second, as found in 
Table 2.1 and Table 2.2, not all households are angel investors or own an actively managed 
business or another asset category, leading to censoring problems when analyzing portfolios. 
Addressing the censoring problem requires the use of multivariate tobit or probit methods, 
depending on the application. Finally, SCF data contains multiply imputed values. The 
econometric method must account for the sampling error induced by these imputations.  
To address the econometric issues, we estimate multivariate probit and tobit models that 
explicitly account for correlated disturbances.  We estimate three sets of models:  (1) 
multivariate probit models of the demand for different categories of assets in the household 
portfolio; (2) multivariate tobit models for the amount of equity held in each category; (3) 
multivariate tobit models for the portfolio share of the asset category, where shares must lie in 
the range from zero to one.  
                                                 
24 The common method in the portfolio choice literature is to run univariate regressions (for example see Campbell 
2006; Rosen and Wu 2004). This literature is mostly focused on financial assets, where we include both non-
financial and financial assets in our regressions. 
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Consider first the multivariate probit model for the incidence of angel investment.  Let yij 
indicate whether household i, i = 1,…,n, holds asset j, j = 1,…,J, in its portfolio.  As in any 
limited dependent variable problem, it is useful to write the model in terms of the latent 
dependent variables.  Let yij* denote the latent propensity of household i to hold asset j and 
specify the set of J asset holding equations as    
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
∗ = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽. (1) 
xij is a vector of characteristics measuring household demographics, socioeconomic status, and 
year that are thought to affect asset holdings of category j, with the associated coefficient vector 
βj. εij is an asset category-specific error term.  In the usual probit fashion, the household is 
observed to hold asset j in its portfolio if the latent propensity is positive:  
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 𝐼𝐼 �𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗∗ > 0�, 
where I[.] = 1 if the expression in brackets holds, and 0 otherwise. 
Since unobserved household characteristics such as risk preferences may affect the demand for 
different assets, the household random error terms from the asset demand equations (2.1) are 
initially assumed to be jointly normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 �
𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖1
𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖2
⋮
𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝐽𝐽
� = Σ = �𝜎𝜎11 𝜎𝜎12 ⋯ 𝜎𝜎1𝐽𝐽𝜎𝜎21 𝜎𝜎22 ⋯ 𝜎𝜎2𝐽𝐽⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝜎𝜎𝐽𝐽1 𝜎𝜎𝐽𝐽2 ⋯ 𝜎𝜎𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽
� (2) 
As is typical in the probit model, because the scale of yij* is not observed, the σjj variance 
parameters are normalized to 1.  The covariance terms σjm in Equation (2.2) indicate the extent to 
which unobservables affecting the holdings of asset j in the portfolio are correlated with those 
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affecting asset m.  Assuming the disturbances are distributed multivariate normal, the model in 
equations (2.1) and (2.2) may be written in more compact form as 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖
∗ ∼ 𝑁𝑁(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽, Σ), (3) 
with yi*, Xi, β, and Σ appropriately defined. 
The framework outlined in equations (2.1) and (2.2) is easily adapted to the multivariate tobit 
model, where the dependent variables yij*, accumulated asset holdings or portfolio share, are 
observed over some range: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = � 𝑦𝑦min 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗∗ ≤ 𝑦𝑦min𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗∗  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗∗ > 𝑦𝑦min 𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗∗ < 𝑦𝑦max
𝑦𝑦max 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗∗ > 𝑦𝑦max  (4) 
When estimating accumulated asset holdings in category j, ymin is set to zero and ymax to positive 
infinity.  In the asset share model, ymin and ymax are set to 0 and 1, respectively. In addition, the 
scale of the dependent variable is partially observed in the tobit models, implying that the σjj are 
identifiable. 
2.4.1 Accounting for Imputation Error  
Collecting data on elements of household portfolios is a difficult task.  Many households do not 
know the values of assets held in different categories, or may refuse to report them.  This may be 
particularly true among wealthy households.  The SCF uses a multiple imputation method to 
impute missing values from other variables in the survey and disguise the information that could 
be used to reveal the identity of a respondent.  Instead of only reporting one imputed value for a 
particular variable, as is done in the Current Population Survey, all five of the imputations, 
termed “implicates,” are reported for each sample member in the survey. Failure to account for 
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imputation error will bias the estimated confidence regions for variables with many imputed 
values. The estimation procedure involves estimating the data on each implicate separately. Then 
it combines the point estimate and standard error from all five implicates to take into account the 
variation resulted from the imputation. (Rubin 2004) 
2.4.2 Basic Control Variables  
The covariate vector xij in Equation (2.1) includes demographic and labor market characteristics 
of the household head, and wealth characteristics of the household that the empirical literature on 
portfolio choice uses to reflect information and transaction costs, background risk associated 
with labor market income, and risk preferences.  In particular, we include demographic variables 
including a quadratic specification of the age of the household head, indicators of education 
level, gender of the head, race, marital status, and the number of children under 18 in the 
household. The age variables will be used to analyze how angel investment activities varies over 
the life-cycle, although we emphasize we cannot identify the cohort effects (Campbell 2006).  It 
has been argued that the young have more labor market flexibility and longer time horizons, 
which might encourage angel investment.  On the other hand, young households may be more 
liquidity constrained, or have less information about high-return angel projects.  One might 
expect that more educated individuals/households have higher permanent income, understand 
new technologies better, and have less labor income risk, each implying a greater propensity to 
make angel investments. Households with children under 18 may be less willing to undertake 
risky, illiquid investments, due to the prospect of increased schooling costs, thus reducing the 
likelihood and amount of angel investment.     
A number of studies of portfolio choice address the issue of uninsurable background risk induced 
by job market uncertainty by including measures of income uncertainty associated with a variety 
88 
 
of occupations (Haliassos and Bertaut 1995; Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese 1996; Guiso and 
Paiella 2008). Employment in a riskier occupation may lead the household to reduce the holdings 
of risky assets. We include two measures of job market status in xij that are likely to reflect labor 
income risk.  First, we include an indicator of self-employment in the household. The indicator 
takes the value of 1 if the household head is self-employed and takes the value of 0 otherwise. 
Self-employment income is more volatile and entrepreneurs are more likely to exit from 
individual businesses (Jensen and Shore 2015; DeBacker et al. 2012), suggesting that the self-
employed may be less likely to make angel investments.  In addition, if shocks to self-
employment income are positively correlated to angel investment returns, entrepreneurs will be 
less likely to make angel investments.  On the other hand, entrepreneurs may be more risk 
tolerant or have greater ability and information to ferret out good investments, thus reducing 
investment costs and encouraging angel investment.  Second, workers with longer job (or 
business) tenures are less likely to leave their jobs and generally have more stable incomes, 
suggesting a greater willingness to become an angel investor.  However, longer job tenure might 
also indicate lacking the breadth of networks that could provide angel investment opportunities. 
Labor income could also have positive or negative association with angel investment. Current 
income may proxy for human capital wealth and have a positive effect on risk tolerance and 
hence, angel investment. On the other hand, income also proxies for opportunity cost. The 
monitoring cost for angel investment would be higher for a person with higher labor income, 
making them less likely to invest. 
We also control for indicators of past and future receipt of inheritance. Inheritances has been 
used in the literature to instrument for wealth (Hurst and Lusardi 2004; Brunnermeier and Nagel 
2008). Angels typically allocate a small percentage of their portfolio to angel investment. Hence, 
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endogeneity is less of a concern compared to some other components of net worth, e.g. active 
business owner equity or risky financial assets. However, the association between angel 
investment and wealth could be due to the unobserved characteristics that are correlated with 
wealth. 
If wealth does not have an effect beyond the unobserved characteristics, such as family 
background, we would expect to the see similar effects on angel investing from having received 
inheritance and expecting to receive inheritance, after controlling for observables such as age. 
The prospect for receiving a windfall acts as a positive shock to the expectation of income in the 
future, which is results in a boost in total wealth. Note that the received inheritances are already 
included in net worth, but the expected inheritances are not reflected in the current net worth, but 
affect the current value of expected life-time income. Assuming similar unobservables governing 
receiving and expecting inheritance, the difference between the estimated coefficients for these 
two variable would be an indicator for the effect of a future wealth shock.   
The effect of wealth on asset ownership relates our work two literatures. The first one is the 
literature on whether there are liquidity constraints impeding individuals from starting their 
businesses (Evans and Jovanovic 1989; Hurst and Lusardi 2004). If there are liquidity 
constraints, a wealth shock should increase business ownership. The second literature estimates 
the elasticity of risky financial assets to wealth, which could be a way to test the assumption of 
constant relation risk aversion (for example see Calvet and Sodini 2014). The fact that we have 
both current business ownership and risky asset holding in our multivariate regressions connect 
the present work to these literatures. 
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Our panel data enables us to investigate further into the determinants of angel investment with 
less concern regarding endogeneity. We delve further into the effect of wealth on angel 
investment by distinguishing between financial and non-financial net worth in our panel data 
analysis. Not only these variables reflect the total wealth of the household, but also they make a 
distinction between the liquid financial wealth and illiquid non-financial assets. Access to 
liquidity could make it easy to make angel investment in a business, where illiquid assets which 
include housing as a major part can serve as collateral for loans.  
2.4.3 Additional Covariates: Sophistication, Motives of Angels, and Exposure 
to Risk  
We use additional control variables in the panel estimations, where we are less concerned about 
endogeneity. We add a set of variables which give us further insight into how sophisticated and 
informed the investors are. More sophisticated angels are expected to choose the ex-ante optimal 
investment among different investment opportunities, both among different types of assets as 
well as different angel investments. Kerr et al (2012) review the screening process undertaken 
before funding is provided for the angel groups they study, which are two successful groups with 
sophisticated angels. The angels go through pre-screening, screening, formal presentation and 
due diligence before the investment is done. On the other end of the continuum are some friends 
and family who may just support ventures with very little investigation. Hence the amount of 
shopping around for investment will give us an idea of how sophisticated angel investors are 
compared to rest of the population. We include two dummy variables for “shopping a great deal 
for investment” and “moderate shopping for investment” (where “almost no shopping for 
investment” is the omitted variable).  
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We control for two additional variables for financial discipline and credit constraints. First, we 
test whether the presence of credit constraints has had an effect on angel investment. Second, we 
control for an indicator of whether the credit card balances are always or almost always paid in 
full. We expect the more sophisticated and financially disciplined investors to pay their credit 
card balances in full amount, after controlling for wealth, and measures of credit constraints and 
background risk.  
Our data does not allow us to identify the motives behind angel investing. The extent to which 
angels invest for financial returns or non-pecuniary benefits remains an interesting question. 
Keeping updated with an industry, joy of being involved in development of a new business, and 
helping young entrepreneurs are among non-pecuniary benefits from angel investing. We can do 
a first pass by examining the altruistic motives of angel investors, which may be important for 
such motives as giving back to community, and helping young entrepreneurs and businesses (or 
helping a friend). The SCF survey includes a question on whether a household’s member has 
volunteered more than one hour per week for a charitable organization in 2006, the year before 
the survey was carried out. We include this variable to proxy for altruism. A caveat with this 
control is that the effect on angel investment could go either way. The coefficient on the 
charitable time will depend on the degree of substitution between charity and angel investment. 
For those who have altruistic motives for angel investment, this variable could proxy for altruism 
and have a positive effect on angel investment, while it could also substitute angel investment. 
Some people may find helping an entrepreneur create jobs more meaningful than volunteering 
for a charity, or vice versa. No matter what the direction of the relationship between angel 
investment and altruistic measures is, a strong correlation between may suggest altruistic motives 
behind angel investment. 
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We also add another set of variables to the panel regressions to ensure that our findings are not 
driven by factors such as variation in household’s exposure to risk, credit constraints, and risk 
preferences (beyond what is captured by risk attitudes). These variables include home to value 
ratio and 2007 shares of primary housing, risky financial assets, and currently owned businesses. 
Finally, a number of other controls are added only in the entry regressions, where we have a 
large enough sample to handle more controls. These include an indicator for spouse’s self-
employment and another indicator for poor health of household head which both further account 
for background risk. Total debt to asset ratio25 and investment real estate share of assets are also 
added. 
2.5 Cross-Sectional Analysis: Who are Angels? 
2.5.1 Ownership of Risky Assets 
1% Sample   
Table 2.4 presents the estimation results from the multivariate probit model of asset holdings in 
the four categories of interest, for the top 1% of the net worth. The table presents a number of 
notable findings.  First, households in 2010 were more likely to hold an angel investment in their 
portfolios than they were in 1998.  There is also an increase in the incidence of being a current 
owner, but not statistically significant, while there is little change in ownership of business 
investment/past managerial assets. The rise in private equity holding coincides with a reduction 
in the choice to hold public equity during the period. Second, one is struck by the stark 
differences of coefficients between angel investing and the holdings of other private assets, 
which highlights differences across components of private equity for the wealthy households. It 
                                                 
25 Our measure of debt to asset ratio is equal to logarithm (1 + ratio of debt to assets). The logarithm tackles the 
large skewness in debt to asset ratios and the number 1 is added in the formula to avoid missing values. 
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appears that angel investing looks more like risky financial assets, aside from their differences in 
time trends. 
Educational attainment is associated with increased likelihood of holding angel and risky 
financial assets and decreased likelihood of current business ownership, but college education is 
only statistically significant for the public equity holdings. This may highlight the importance of 
information, e.g. in evaluating investment opportunities, and understanding new technologies 
and trends in the market. The same set of skills useful for investment may not be as useful for 
being an entrepreneur.26 Being female strongly reduces past managerial business ownership. The 
corresponding coefficient for current business ownership is also negative, but not statistically 
significant at the 10% level. 
Because business owners make up 63% of our sample of high net worth households, angel 
investors are likely to be current entrepreneurs. However, as Table 2.4 indicates, households with 
a self-employed head are not more likely to make angel investments, conditional on net worth. 
This might be a result of the reluctance of self-employed households, who are subject to riskier 
incomes, from engaging in further risk taking through angel investment. Such a reluctance from 
additional risk taking is reflected in the negative effect of self-employment on holdings of risky 
financial assets. A similar negative effect could make angel investing less attractive for 
entrepreneurs and cancel out the positive effect of self-employment on access to information 
about investment opportunities.27 On the other hand, the role of information might be minimal 
                                                 
26 Reverse causality may have a role in driving the negative association. Those with high entrepreneurial skills may 
not find it worthwhile to pursue high education. 
 
27 In unreported estimations, when we control for self-employment in the equation determining current business 
ownership, the effect of self-employment becomes negative. However, we drop self-employment due to too much 
commonality between the two variables at the same period.  
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for these wealthy households who are likely to be financially sophisticated and able to address 
their lack of information by monetary means. Another variable that proxies for exposure to 
entrepreneurial risk is business share, but we do not include it as a covariate, since it is 
determined endogenously as a part of the portfolio choice along with angel investment. 
However, the endogeneity will be less of a concern in our panel analysis, where we will control 
for it.   
Even among high net worth households, we still observe that holdings of private equity assets 
increase with wealth.  This may reflect declining absolute risk aversion, or reduced information 
and transaction costs for wealthier households. The fact that the marginal impact of net worth is 
significant for business equity holdings of any type, but not for risky financial assets leads one to 
suspect that information costs play an important role for private equity. Wealthier households 
may have greater access to social networks and professionals who could provide them with better 
angel investment opportunities. The declining absolute risk aversion also seems to play an 
important role, as we will show that using the variation in the expectation of receiving 
inheritance. Another interesting similarity between angel and risky financial assets is the positive 
association between high risk attitudes and holdings of these two assets, where risk attitudes are 
not significant for past and current business ownership.  
However, the effect of expecting inheritance is starkly different for angel ownership. Expecting 
to receive inheritance in the future is associated with a highly significant rise in the likelihood of 
being an angel investor, but is not associated with likelihood of holding other asset categories. 
The reason for a positive effect from expecting an inheritance might be the increase in the 
current value of total wealth, where total wealth is defined as the sum of current net worth and 
the current value of expected future income and inheritances. An increase in total wealth could 
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decrease relative risk aversion, which may increase the share of risky assets in portfolio.28 
Hence, we might argue that expecting inheritance can be considered as a boost to total wealth. 
This increase in total wealth for the 1% appears to result in raising the probability of being an 
angel investor, but has no significant effect on the likelihood of current business ownership or 
ownership of risky financial assets.29 
For angel investment, the coefficients on expecting inheritance and having received inheritance 
are very different in magnitude, while the corresponding coefficients are similar for other asset 
categories. When the dependent variable is being an angel, the estimated coefficient for having 
received inheritance is highly insignificant and much lower than the one for expecting 
inheritance. It suggest that the relationship between wealth and angel investment is not driven by 
unobserved characteristics, implying a causal effect from wealth. This finding is especially 
notable since it indicates that even among the top 1% of net worth, wealth plays an important 
role for becoming an angel investor. 
 Representative Sample 
Table 2.5 presents the results for the full sample, which are in general different with what we 
found for the top 1%. There is no statistically significant changes through time in angel 
participation for the full sample. Similar to what we found for the wealthy, willingness to take 
high risk is associated with higher probability of angel investing. Willingness to take high risk is 
                                                 
28 To the degree that an inheritance received in an uncertain time in the future is pledgeable, expecting to receive an 
inheritance might make the credit constraints less binding. To the extent this is true, we could interpret 
insignificance of the inheritance variable in the current ownership as evidence for non-existence of credit constraints 
for entrepreneurs.  
29 One might argue the reason that an indicator for holding non-zero risky financial asset is not affected by expecting 
inheritance is because the vast majority of the 1% already hold some risky financial assets. However, as we will 
discuss in Section 5.2, we find similar effect when we use the share of risky financial assets as the dependent 
variable.   
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also associated with current business ownership, while both high and average risk attitudes are 
highly significant for owning risky financial assets. The effect of average risk attitudes is not 
statistically significant at 10% for both samples, but is weaker for the representative sample. It 
may suggest that for the whole sample, a higher degree of risk taking results in angel investment, 
while the rich might afford taking angel investment risk even with an average risk tolerance, 
implying that attitudes toward risk are more important for the 1%. As we will see, our panel data 
results confirm this notion. 
Higher wealth is associated with higher ownership in all risky assets. Unlike what we found for 
the 1%, self-employment increases the probability of being an angel investor. This may indicate 
the importance of information acquisition. The information about the angel investment 
opportunities may be more readily available to the rich with more access to entrepreneurial 
networks, but the typical household may not acquire such information unless they are 
entrepreneurial. Higher tenure with the current employer is associated with lower participation in 
ownership of non-actively managed business, both angel investment and past business 
ownership. This may be due to a substitution toward public equity for those with higher tenures, 
e.g. through retirement plans. 
For the representative sample, there is a strong positive association between expecting 
inheritance and angel ownership, while the coefficient on expecting to receive inheritance is 
insignificant. This suggests a causal link from wealth to angel participation, and is similar to 
what we found for the 1%. In contrast, for current business ownership, having received 
inheritance is significant and expecting inheritance insignificant, which is more in line with 
having inherited businesses rather than a wealth effect. For risky financial assets, both expecting 
inheritance and having received inheritance are significant and similar in magnitude. This 
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similarity suggests that much of the association between wealth and incidence of risky asset 
ownership might be explained by unobservable characteristics, such as family background, 
which are correlated with both inheritance variables.  
The coefficient estimates imply that likelihood of having angel equity has a different life cycle 
pattern from current ownership and risky financial asset holdings. Being an angel is estimated as 
a convex function of age, where its likelihood becomes is minimum at about 70 years old and 
increases after that. In contrast, current business and risky financial asset ownership have 
concave relationships with age; the likelihood of business ownership peaks at before 30 years 
old, while the less precisely estimates for risky financial asset ownership fall throughout all ages. 
Note, however, that we cannot distinguish between age and cohort effects, and age may pick up 
the effect of unobservable variables such as financial literacy (van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie 
2011), experience, and return expectations (Malmendier and Nagel 2011).  
Covariances 
Table 2.6 shows the correlation across unobservables for the multivariate probit regressions for 
both the 1% and the full sample. We find no significant correlation between angel investment 
and other categories after controlling for observables. Hence, we will focus on the results for the 
top 1%, which show more interesting relationship between the unobserved determinants of angel 
investing and other assets. 
For the wealthy, after controlling for the observables, we find a positive correlation between the 
participation in angel investment and ownership of risky financial assets. However, we find a 
negative correlation between the unobserved components of angel investment and current 
business ownership. The correlation between unobservables may provide some information 
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regarding the motives behind angel investment, through the direction of correlation between 
unobserved attributes of people who participate in angel investment and other forms of risky 
investment.  
Kerr et al. (2012) emphasize the importance of understanding how dual motives of angels, i.e. 
financial returns and non-pecuniary benefits, affect their approach and the type of support they 
provide. Non-pecuniary benefits are an important determinant of entrepreneurship (Hamilton 
2000) and one may argue that some of nonpecuniary motives for angel investment are similar to 
those from entrepreneurship, e.g. the joy of developing new ideas, being involved with startups, 
or flexible hours. If these common unobservables are a major determinant of angel investment, 
we may expect a positive correlation between the unobservables determining being an angel and 
being a current owner. But we in fact find the opposite; after controlling for observables, we find 
a negative correlation between participation in actively managed business ownership and angel 
investment. 
On the other hand, the positive correlation between the unobserved determinants of risky 
financial assets and angel investment might suggest further similarity between risky financial 
assets and angel investments. This correlation could be due to unobservables such as similar 
perceived value for these two assets, or similarity in the information sets that affect investment in 
either of the two. 
2.5.2  Portfolio Shares and Value of Equity Holdings 
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 present multivariate tobit estimates of the fraction of the household’s net 
worth that is held in the listed assets. Table 2.7 shows the results for the top 1%, where Table 2.8 
shows the results for the full sample. The positive effect of wealth and high risk attitudes on 
angel shares are significant at the 10% level, in line with findings for participation. Similar to 
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participation regressions, there is a strong positive association between expecting inheritance and 
angel equity share, while such association disappears for having received inheritance. This 
finding suggests positive wealth elasticity of angel equity even among the top 1% of net worth. 
In contrast, we find no similar evidence of positive wealth elasticity for other listed assets. The 
importance of wealth could reflect access to opportunities or an understanding of the highly risky 
nature of angel investments. The share estimations of angel equity for the whole sample are 
similar to what we found for participation. A difference is that the share of angel investment in 
the portfolio of a typical household appears to have fallen during the period of our study. 
Tables 2.9 and 2.10 presents multivariate tobit estimates of the value of asset holdings, including 
the amount of angel equity held in the household’s portfolio. Table 2.9 shows the result for the 
wealthy and Table 2.10 shows the results for the whole population. Most of the findings are 
similar to what presented in Tables 2.7 and 2.8. For example for the full sample, after accounting 
for household characteristics, the desired accumulated angel investment rose between 1998 and 
2010.  One notable difference is that the amount of actively managed business equity declined, 
potentially offsetting the rise in the number of business owners.  It is also the case that 
households earning higher wages and salaries had larger amounts of accumulated angel 
investment holdings. Higher wage indicates larger permanent income, which may increase risk 
taking. Moreover, high wage households may have less need for liquidity of these assets which 
allows them to carry these assets for a longer period. 
2.6 Panel Data Analysis 
Our primary dependent variable thus far has been an indicator of whether the individual had 
angel investment equity, which is the net result of becoming an angel, remaining an angel, or 
opting out of angel investment ownership. In other words it is determined by selection both into 
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and out of angel investment. Hence, the natural question is: who are entrants and who remains an 
angel? Ideally we would like to have multiple periods of longitudinal data, but the SCF only 
contains a two year panel at the period during and after the financial crisis, which potentially 
limits the generalizability of our findings.  
In this section, we study the effect of 2007 variables on the changes in angel investment status 
among households between 2007 and 2009. The predetermined nature of control variables 
alleviates concerns about endogeneity issues. The main question is how to define the change in 
angel investment status, which proves to be rather challenging due to the limitations of the data. 
Unfortunately, we do not observe whether the household actively managed any of the currently 
non-actively managed businesses implying that we cannot directly distinguish between angels 
and past managers. Consequently, we use other pieces of data to identify changes in angel 
investment status. Appendix B provides the details. 
We define individuals who become angel investors as those who did not have any non-actively 
managed (NAM) businesses in 2007 and acquired such businesses in 2009. We identify and 
exclude those who became a past owner in 2009 for their actively managed (AM) business in 
2007, since they are considered to be past managers according to our definition above. This 
definition is convenient since it provides us with a more homogeneous sample, including only 
those who introduced angel investment to their portfolios during the period of our study. In a 
similar fashion, we define individuals exiting angel investing as those who had angel investments 
in their portfolios in 2007, but did not have them in 2009.  
2.6.1  Who Becomes an Angel? 
The results for becoming an angel as the dependent variable can be seen in Table 2.11 for the 1% 
and in Table 2.12 for the full sample. Focusing on the last column with our full set of controls, 
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there are notable differences between the wealthy and the full population. Subjective attitudes 
towards risk are significant for the 1%, but we do not observe such an effect for the full sample. 
Higher risk taking is associated with higher chances of becoming an angel. Among the wealthy, 
the probability of becoming an angel has a convex relationship with age. Younger people have 
the highest probability of becoming an angel. The probability declines with age and is minimized 
at the age of about 73 and increases for older ages. The wealthy who become angels tend to be 
white, where we see no significant effect of race for the full sample.  
In both samples, households with heads who paid their credit card balance fully were more likely 
to become angel. This indicates that angels have more financial discipline. However, this finding 
may also be due to the existence of financial constraints for potential angel investors, resulting in 
selection of those with no financial constraints into angel investment. Note that the effect of 
credit card balances is robust to including a measure of credit constraints and loan to value ratios 
at 2007. Another indicator of shrewdness among the households in the full sample is the 
association between shopping a great deal for investment and becoming an angel. Endogeneity 
may be a concern in this case, but it would only strengthen our finding: whether the people who 
shop a great deal become angels, or people shop a great deal because they want to become an 
angel, the positive association is indicative of sophistication in investment strategies among 
potential angels.  
Another notable result is the positive impact of financial assets on becoming an angel investor. 
This is true despite the fact that we have restricted our attention to the people with the highest 
levels of net worth. Our results suggest that the wealthy who became angels were those with 
more liquid wealth. Hence liquidity has been important in acquiring angel equity in the aftermath 
of the financial crisis.  
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In contrast, non-financial assets seem to have a positive effect on the probability of becoming an 
angel investor among the whole population. Our panel data results are in line with our cross 
section results indicating positive effect of wealth on angel investment. The importance of non-
financial wealth as opposed to financial wealth for the average household might reflect the low 
variation in financial net worth for typical households, who have housing and other non-financial 
assets as major components of their portfolios.30  
Credit constraints are correlated with becoming an angel in the 1% sample, as shown in columns 
3 and 4, but the correlation substantially weakens after the addition of debt to assets ratio and 
spouse’s self-employment, which are both negatively correlated with becoming an angel and the 
latter could be considered as another proxy for credit constraints.  
The coefficient on having received inheritance is positive and not statistically significant in both 
panel and cross sectional data, but the coefficient for expecting to receive inheritance in the 
future becomes negative for the top 1% panel data and not significant for the full sample. This is 
not surprising, considering the substantial changes in wealth, and hence inheritance expectations, 
during the 2007–2009 period. While expecting inheritance in 2007 may predict more risk 
tolerance, opposite might happen when they learn much of that inheritance has evaporated due to 
falling stock prices. Therefore, depending on the change in expectations there are two opposite 
effects working in this period. Given that, the negative estimates for the top 1% might suggest a 
substantial fall in inheritance expectations for these wealthy households. 
                                                 
30 Ghahreman (2016) finds evidence suggesting that downsizing primary residence has played a role in portfolio 
rebalancing at the same period. He finds an association between becoming a current owner of an actively managed 
business with selling homes. Similar association might hold for non-actively managed angel investments.  
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The final notable finding is that self-employed households are more likely to become angel 
investors and the effect holds for both top 1% and representative samples. For the top 1%, this 
effect becomes more statistically significant at columns 4 and 5 when we add extra variables that 
proxy for risk tolerance and exposure to risk, such as controls for asset and debt holdings in 
2007. Assuming we control properly for risk preferences and exposure, this result suggests that 
entrepreneurs may either receive greater non-pecuniary benefit from making an angel 
investment, or have greater access to information (e.g. about the existence and quality of 
investment opportunities). To the extent that non-pecuniary benefits are related to altruism, such 
as the desire to “help the community” by funding startups, we find no correlation between 
volunteerism (as measured by charitable giving) and the decision to make angel investments. In 
terms of the information explanation, we are unable to calculate returns to angel investments in 
our sample, so we cannot test whether the self-employed enjoy an informational advantage that 
allows them to invest in startups with higher returns than non-entrepreneurs. 
2.6.2  Who Exits Angel Investments? 
Our sample for studying angel investment exit is much more limited. While we have a fair 
amount of exit,31 we found that our coefficient estimates were dramatically impacted by the 
inclusion of a handful of outliers in our sample of 228 angels in 2007. We address this issue by 
focusing only on households with a white male household head, which makes our result much 
more robust. This might be due to different behaviors according to race and gender that we are 
unable to capture with our limited number of observations. Using this sample exclusion, we 
                                                 
31 We have 228 angels in the 2007 sample, where 112 of them are no longer an angel in 2009. 
104 
 
dropped 19 observations and are left with 209 households, of which 104 exited angel investing 
completely by 2009.  
Our analysis of exit is complicated by the fact that there are different ways in which an angel 
investment in a specific firm is discontinued. For any individual business, exit could be 
successful or unsuccessful, with quite different underlying reasons. The exit may be the result of 
a successful acquisition or IPO, or a failure of the business through bankruptcy. We note that the 
angel investor typically does not have control rights which would unilaterally allow him to 
choose to exit, but he may still be able to sell shares to other investors or back to the 
entrepreneur. While we do not have data on the quality of exits, we note that 2007-2009 was a 
period with less successful IPOs taking place as a result of the weak stock market. Therefore, a 
firm with a potential for IPO was more likely to delay it until the stock market and the economy 
got stronger. Consequently, the probability of a successful exit is likely to be lower than normal. 
Moreover, successful angels might have been more likely to continue making angel investments 
and less likely to be observed exiting altogether.  
Tables 2.13 and 2.14 show strong evidence that those exiting angel investment were less 
educated. This is consistent with the view that higher levels of education are associated with 
better angel investment decisions.32 For both samples, the results we find for the effect of age on 
exit reinforce what we found for the effect of age on entry, although the effect of age on exit is 
only significant for the wealthy. A rough aggregation of entry and exit dependence on age shows 
                                                 
32 Note that it is rather unlikely that many exits from being an angel are a result of angel firms in 2007 being actively 
managed by the same household in 2009. For example, for 94 out of 112 households who exited, the number of 
NAM businesses disowned at 2009 was strictly higher than the number of new AM businesses. This suggests that 
most households who exited being an angel experienced exit from ownership, not change in the management status 
from non-active to an active manager.  
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that the wealthy and representative sample have different life-cycle patterns: the net entry 
likelihood become lowest at an age of above 70 years old for the top 1%, while the net entry 
becomes highest at the age of nearly 50 years old for the full sample.33 
Household portfolio allocations also play an important role in the decision to exit angel 
investing. First, the higher the angel share in the portfolio, the less likely is the probability of exit 
for the wealthy. This is consistent with the illiquid nature of the angel investment, which makes 
it more difficult to exit with a higher share, holding constant the wealth level. In both samples, 
we also observe that those with higher non-financial wealth are less likely to exit. Hence, the 
positive effect of non-financial wealth on angel investment takes place both through entry and 
exit. Moreover, those with higher risky shares are more likely to exit in the case of the wealthy 
households. The effect of risky share may be a result of adjusting the portfolio toward being less 
risky after the financial crisis. Those with higher risky share might have adjusted their portfolio 
by reducing private equity holdings. Finally, our results are consistent with the notion that credit 
constraints negatively affect angel investing. We observed some evidence suggesting credit 
constraints has a role in impeding entry for the top 1%. Here, we find corresponding evidence for 
the representative sample that those who are credit constrained are more likely to exit.  
As before, we measure financial sophistication and responsibility using information on whether 
the individual paid credit card balances in full and/or shopped around for investments. Those 
who paid their credit card balances in full were less likely to exit, after controlling for credit 
constraints. This indicates a double layer of selection determining those who are angels, where 
more sophisticated are selected through both entry and exit. For the wealthy, similar double 
                                                 
33 Only considering the quantities estimated, entry in minimized at age 72.5, while exit is maximized at 74.4 for the 
1%. For the full sample, entry is maximized at 48, while exit is maximized at 46.  
106 
 
selection happens through higher exit likelihood of those who shop none for investment. But for 
the full sample, we find that those who don’t shop around for investment are less likely to exit. 
This is consistent with the behavior of non-professional angel investors with motivations beyond 
financial returns, less concerned about returns gained by liquidating their investment. It is also in 
line with the evidence found by Goldfarb et al (2013) that those businesses who are funded by 
angels take more time to exit. 
To summarize, the results of this section support the findings from our earlier analysis of the 
repeated cross-section data. Among the wealthy, higher risk tolerance is associated with a greater 
likelihood of becoming an angel. In addition, self-employed individuals are also more likely to 
become angel investors even after controlling for risk measures, supporting the view that 
entrepreneurs either have greater information regarding startup investment opportunities, or have 
non-pecuniary preferences for owning early stage companies. We also observe that financially 
sophisticated and responsible individuals are more likely to become and remain angel investors. 
Liquidity also plays an important role, as households holding more liquid assets have a higher 
probability of becoming angel investors.  
2.7 Conclusion 
We study the trends in angel investment in a representative sample of the U.S. economy and 
explore the characteristics of angel investors. The angel investment activity have remained 
steady through time, when compared to the dramatic institutional venture capital cycles. We not 
only focused on a representative sample of the U.S. economy, but also did a separate analysis on 
a representative subsample of the household with top 1% of wealth, who tend to more 
homogenous, have more angel investments and are the major owners of angel equity in the 
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economy. The participation of this group of angels have in fact been on the rise during the period 
of our study, 1998–2010, unaffected by the institutional venture capital bust and the recessions.  
Our results suggest that angel investment is highly concentrated among the wealthiest 
households, and wealth plays an important role in participation even among the top 1% of wealth 
distribution. We provide some evidence through the variation in expected inheritances that the 
effect of wealth in beyond the unobserved characteristics it might be correlated with.  
In our representative sample, self-employment plays an important role in predicting the 
incidence of being an angel and angel equity share, but the relationship is mixed for the top 1%. 
Cross-sectional and panel evidence for the representative sample indicate that self-employment 
is positively correlated with angel ownership, while for the 1% the relationship is mixed. This 
might be due to more uniform access to information among the wealthy households who have a 
larger and more informed networks and are more likely to be contacted by entrepreneurs. Hence, 
when controlling for information, one might expect that the riskiness of self-employment income 
decrease the likelihood of angel participation. On the other hand, for the full sample, which 
represent all the population, the positive association between self-employment and angel 
ownership may be due to larger access to information about angel investment opportunities 
among the self-employed individuals. 
Self-reported willingness to take financial risk is generally associated with a higher likelihood of 
being an angel investor and a larger share of angel equity in different specification, especially for 
the 1%. The angels are likely to be more financially disciplined as measured by their credit card 
balances and how much effort they put into choosing their investments. While the high 
concentration of angel equity in portfolios of some investors indicate high exposures to 
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concentrated risk, large net worth of average angels, their higher financial discipline and risk 
tolerance might reflect their awareness about the risky nature of this investments. 
Our analysis is mostly descriptive but revealing in the sense that it provides information 
regarding an understudied but important population of investors who tend to be critical for the 
early stages of businesses. There remains many questions to be answered about the causal effect 
of different variables on angel investing. While we did a preliminary analysis of how wealth 
affects likelihood of being an angel, many other questions would require data on the demand side 
of angel investment and more detailed data on the type of businesses that angels invest in. For 
example, having information on the business will help us evaluate the extent of diversification in 
angel investments and the relation between angel investors’ backgrounds and the type of 
investments they make. 
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2.8 Appendices 
2.8.1  Tables 
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics for the Top 1% of Each Year 
 
 Year 
 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 
Angel 0.13 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.22 
Owner 0.59 0.60 0.62 0.68 0.65 
Past Manager 0.055 0.072 0.05 0.041 0.056 
Have Risky 0.97 0.95 0.93 0.96 0.94 
Age 58.3 56.8 58.7 59.2 60.3 
College Grad 0.81 0.84 0.8 0.86 0.88 
White 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.91 0.93 
Married 0.83 0.87 0.86 0.91 0.89 
Kids Under 18 0.57 0.54 0.6 0.52 0.54 
Employer Tenure 14.3 15.1 14.8 15.9 16.6 
High Risk Attitudes 0.44 0.38 0.38 0.44 0.35 
Avg. Risk Attitudes 0.51 0.55 0.52 0.51 0.58 
Net Worth Percentiles (in Million 
Dollars)     
25% 6.1 8.38 8.93 9.88 8.4 
50% 7.83 10.9 11 12.5 11.2 
75% 12.5 16 16.3 18.3 16.1 
Risky Assets Percentiles (in $100 K)     
25% 5.22 4.9 4.09 4.62 6.15 
50% 24.5 24.4 20.7 17.2 20 
75% 47.5 68.4 52.9 58.4 40 
Primary Residence Percentiles (in 
$100 K)     
25% 4 4.9 7.48 7.86 6.5 
50% 6 9.19 11.5 13.1 12 
75% 10.6 18.4 23 22.7 20 
Observations 635 663 710 686 651 
Notes: Population weights are used for computing summary statistics. 
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Table 2.2 Summary Statistics for the Top 1% of Each Year 
 
 Year 
 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 
Angel 0.0106 0.0139 0.0118 0.0121 0.0101 
Owner 0.117 0.123 0.124 0.125 0.124 
Past Manager 0.0034 0.0031 0.0031 0.0035 0.0033 
Have Risky 0.50 0.53 0.51 0.52 0.47 
Age 48.7 49.0 49.6 50.0 50.5 
College Grad 0.33 0.34 0.37 0.35 0.37 
White 0.78 0.77 0.74 0.74 0.71 
Married 0.59 0.60 0.58 0.59 0.58 
Kids Under 18 0.71 0.71 0.68 0.70 0.68 
Employer Tenure 6.36 6.98 6.61 6.47 6.57 
High Risk Attitudes 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.20 0.17 
Avg. Risk Attitudes 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.36 
Net Worth Percentiles (in Million 
Dollars)     
25% 0.013 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.008 
50% 0.096 0.106 0.107 0.127 0.077 
75% 0.279 0.353 0.379 0.391 0.3 
Risky Assets Percentiles (in $100 K)     
25% 0 0 0 0 0 
50% 0.0003 0.0098 0.0023 0.005 0 
75% 0.397 0.527 0.426 0.451 0.309 
Primary Residence Percentiles (in 
$100 K)     
25% 0 0 0 0 6.5 
50% 0.867 0.919 1.151 1.257 12 
75% 1.667 1.961 2.474 2.724 20 
Observations 4305 4442 4519 4417 651 
Notes: Population weights are used for computing summary statistics. 
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Table 2.3 Characteristics of Angels Investors 
 
 Year 
 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 
Panel A: Top 1% of Each Year 
Being Owner 0.49 0.45 0.6 0.56 0.56 
Owner Share 0.18 0.11 0.26 0.19 0.18 
Angel Share 0.21 0.16 0.1 0.13 0.13 
Risky Share 0.27 0.44 0.27 0.29 0.25 
Angel Value (in $100 K) 29.8 25.4 23.9 35.9 26.7 
Angel Equity Share (of Net Worth) Percentiles   
25% 0.022 0.011 0.01 0.01 0.013 
50% 0.056 0.049 0.025 0.045 0.036 
75% 0.2 0.22 0.095 0.1 0.17 
90% 0.9 0.55 0.33 0.42 0.35 
Angel Equity Value Percentiles (in $100 K)    
25% 1.33 1.23 1.15 1.57 1.12 
50% 4.8 5.56 3.45 7.86 5 
75% 45.4 24.5 18.1 31.4 18.8 
Net Worth Percentiles (in Million Dollars)     
25% 6.75 10.1 10.1 10.6 8.99 
50% 10.3 12 13.6 15.1 12 
75% 16.8 16.5 21.1 23.4 21.9 
Panel B: Representative Sample 
Being Owner 0.28 0.26 0.45 0.29 0.45 
Owner Share 0.073 0.06 0.14 0.091 0.017 
Angel Share 0.19 0.12 0.072 0.17 0.16 
Risky Share 0.27 0.27 0.21 0.21 0.25 
Angel Value (in $100 K) 5.47 4.69 6.11 8.72 7.51 
Angel Equity Share (of Net Worth) Percentiles     
25% 0.018 0.0049 0.018 0.016 0 
50% 0.049 0.03 0.11 0.076 0.014 
75% 0.28 0.16 0.26 0.28 0.2 
90% 0.57 0.44 0.52 0.61 0.58 
Angel Equity Value Percentiles (in $100 K)    
25% 0.13 0.027 0.22 0.1 0 
50% 0.67 0.37 1.15 1.05 0.5 
75% 3.07 1.84 2.88 5.24 4 
Net Worth Percentiles (in Million Dollars)     
25% 0.4 0.32 0.53 0.51 0.61 
50% 0.72 0.99 1.39 1.21 2.47 
75% 3.25 4.01 4.21 6.07 5.74 
112 
 
Notes: Population weights are used for computing summary statistics. 
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Table 2.4 Incidence of Risky Asset Ownership for the Top 1% 
 
 Angel Owner Past Manager Risky Fin. 
Age -0.028 0.000 0.014 0.026 
 (0.039) (0.042) (0.048) (0.074) 
Age2/100 0.026 -0.032 -0.005 -0.030 
 (0.031) (0.033) (0.038) (0.057) 
Some College 0.298 -0.174 -0.090 0.131 
 (0.281) (0.247) (0.304) (0.275) 
Undergrad Degree 0.140 -0.441** 0.040 0.610** 
 (0.244) (0.196) (0.229) (0.252) 
Post-Grad Degree 0.322 -0.537*** 0.113 1.198*** 
 (0.240) (0.198) (0.221) (0.293) 
White -0.125 -0.114 0.209 0.222 
 (0.238) (0.246) (0.249) (0.294) 
Female 0.267 -0.355 -0.925*** 0.304 
 (0.316) (0.286) (0.296) (0.620) 
Married 0.044 0.277 -0.246 -0.130 
 (0.189) (0.188) (0.214) (0.246) 
Kids Less 18 0.009 0.036 -0.006 0.054 
 (0.055) (0.061) (0.070) (0.099) 
Self-Employed 
Head 
0.056  0.039 -0.626** 
 (0.162)  (0.224) (0.282) 
Employer Tenure -0.004 0.040*** -0.011** 0.007 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) 
2001 0.188 -0.112 0.049 -0.401 
 (0.183) (0.167) (0.271) (0.289) 
2004 0.244 0.017 -0.120 -0.340 
 (0.173) (0.168) (0.238) (0.280) 
2007 0.135 0.181 -0.259 -0.362 
 (0.178) (0.177) (0.240) (0.249) 
2010 0.309* 0.114 -0.065 -0.412* 
 (0.178) (0.176) (0.217) (0.224) 
Log(Income+1) 0.011  0.069 0.122*** 
 (0.033)  (0.051) (0.032) 
Log Net Worth 0.214** 0.178** 0.167** 0.023 
 (0.103) (0.080) (0.081) (0.113) 
Expect Inheritance 0.293** -0.128 0.100 -0.036 
 (0.136) (0.141) (0.193) (0.247) 
Received 
Inheritance 
0.084 0.036 0.031 0.143 
 (0.110) (0.111) (0.160) (0.202) 
High Risk Attitude 0.427* 0.073 0.334 1.169*** 
 (0.258) (0.190) (0.221) (0.279) 
Average Risk 0.397 0.150 0.283 1.286*** 
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 (0.255) (0.181) (0.212) (0.256) 
Constant -4.621** -1.874 -6.049*** -1.851 
 (2.008) (1.827) (2.050) (2.760) 
Notes: This table report multivariate probit estimates, where independent variables are indicators of asset ownership. 
Pooled SCF cross-sections of 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 are used for estimations. Standard errors are in 
parentheses *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Population weights are used.  
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Table 2.5 Incidence of Risky Asset Ownership for the Representative Samples 
 
 Angel Owner Investor Have Risky 
Age -0.039*** 0.016** -0.012 -0.010** 
 (0.013) (0.007) (0.021) (0.005) 
Age2/100 0.028** -0.032*** 0.011 -0.002 
 (0.012) (0.006) (0.019) (0.005) 
Some College -0.067 0.061 0.207 0.205*** 
 (0.105) (0.042) (0.147) (0.034) 
Undergrad Degree -0.016 -0.050 0.132 0.312*** 
 (0.086) (0.040) (0.143) (0.038) 
Post-Grad Degree 0.087 -0.029 0.051 0.415*** 
 (0.089) (0.047) (0.141) (0.049) 
White 0.060 0.157*** -0.006 0.278*** 
 (0.093) (0.041) (0.155) (0.032) 
female -0.015 -0.274*** -0.101 0.119*** 
 (0.130) (0.057) (0.257) (0.045) 
Married 0.014 0.115** 0.243 0.103** 
 (0.109) (0.045) (0.192) (0.040) 
Kids Less 18 -0.025 0.010 -0.056 -0.033** 
 (0.031) (0.014) (0.045) (0.013) 
Self-Employed 
Head 
0.242***  0.142 -0.632*** 
 (0.082)  (0.122) (0.047) 
Employer Tenure -0.007*** 0.020*** -0.013*** 0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) 
2001 0.036 -0.053 -0.115 0.016 
 (0.094) (0.047) (0.146) (0.041) 
2004 -0.050 -0.015 -0.107 -0.032 
 (0.098) (0.047) (0.147) (0.044) 
2007 -0.056 -0.039 -0.112 -0.012 
 (0.094) (0.047) (0.142) (0.042) 
2010 -0.046 0.064 -0.102 -0.034 
 (0.089) (0.043) (0.133) (0.040) 
Log(Income+1) 0.050  -0.056 0.183*** 
 (0.041)  (0.038) (0.021) 
Log Net Worth 0.331*** 0.312*** 0.326*** 0.317*** 
 (0.032) (0.014) (0.046) (0.011) 
Expect Inheritance 0.283*** -0.014 0.133 0.130*** 
 (0.070) (0.039) (0.120) (0.041) 
Received 
Inheritance 
0.024 0.068** 0.060 0.099*** 
 (0.061) (0.033) (0.092) (0.033) 
High Risk Attitude 0.190* 0.091** 0.093 0.845*** 
 (0.098) (0.042) (0.145) (0.039) 
Average Risk 0.095 -0.002 -0.122 0.599*** 
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 (0.093) (0.037) (0.133) (0.030) 
Constant -5.965*** -5.202*** -6.063*** -5.808*** 
 (0.447) (0.195) (0.714) (0.222) 
Notes: This table report multivariate probit estimates, where independent variables are indicators of asset ownership. 
Pooled SCF cross-sections of 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 are used for estimations. Standard errors are in 
parentheses *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Population weights are used.  
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Table 2.6 Estimated Correlations from Multivariate Probit Regression 
 
Pair of Assets Top 1% All Sample 
   Angel – Owner -0.185*** -0.038 
 (0.086) (0.045) 
Angel – Past Manager -0.307*** -0.158 
 (0.080) (0.092) 
Angel – Risky 0.195** 0.004 
 (0.087) (0.040) 
Owner – Past 
 
-0.079 -0.056 
 (0.125) (0.068) 
Owner – Risky -0.169 -0.033 
 (0.164) (0.022) 
Past Manager – Risky 0.205 -0.001 
 (0.193) (0.038) 
Notes: The numbers are the estimated correlations between error terms from four equations, which are estimated 
jointly using multivariate probit. The first column reports the estimated correlation corresponding to Table 4 
coefficients, and the second column reports the ones corresponding to Table 5. The dependent variable in these 
equations are indicators for being an angel, current owner, past owner/business investor, and having risky financial 
assets. Standard errors are in parentheses *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Population weights are used. 
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Table 2.7 Asset Shares for the Top 1% 
 
 Angel Share Owner Share Past Mngr. 
Share 
Risky Share 
Age -0.014 -0.013 0.009 0.008 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.029) (0.008) 
Age2 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Some College 0.076 -0.014 -0.079 0.093* 
 (0.089) (0.070) (0.158) (0.049) 
Undergrad Degree 0.049 -0.101* -0.039 0.134*** 
 (0.079) (0.057) (0.124) (0.035) 
Post-Grad Degree 0.100 -0.197*** -0.005 0.192*** 
 (0.078) (0.058) (0.119) (0.035) 
White -0.021 -0.093 0.128 0.073* 
 (0.062) (0.076) (0.139) (0.039) 
female 0.148 -0.182* -0.498*** 0.080 
 (0.107) (0.099) (0.186) (0.069) 
Married 0.028 0.078 -0.108 -0.030 
 (0.059) (0.064) (0.121) (0.053) 
Kids Less 18 0.001 0.011 0.001 -0.016* 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.035) (0.010) 
Self-Employed Head 0.043  -0.007 -0.002 
 (0.044)  (0.102) (0.022) 
Employer Tenure -0.002 0.013*** -0.005* -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
2001 0.062 -0.059 -0.009 -0.018 
 (0.063) (0.051) (0.141) (0.032) 
2004 0.053 -0.042 -0.065 -0.066** 
 (0.054) (0.050) (0.121) (0.030) 
2007 0.034 0.046 -0.131 -0.095*** 
 (0.061) (0.049) (0.135) (0.029) 
2010 0.067 -0.005 -0.157 -0.103*** 
 (0.062) (0.048) (0.131) (0.031) 
Log(Income+1) -0.002  0.024 0.007 
 (0.008)  (0.022) (0.005) 
Log Net Worth 0.060* 0.106*** 0.093** -0.003 
 (0.030) (0.022) (0.040) (0.014) 
Expect Inheritance 0.099** 0.014 0.007 -0.001 
 (0.046) (0.043) (0.089) (0.023) 
Received Inheritance 0.013 -0.041 -0.030 0.015 
 (0.035) (0.033) (0.079) (0.020) 
High Risk Attitude 0.170* -0.036 0.246* 0.146*** 
 (0.092) (0.062) (0.142) (0.048) 
Average Risk 0.119 -0.039 0.200 0.151*** 
 (0.086) (0.060) (0.131) (0.048) 
Constant -1.217* -0.740 -3.049*** -0.375 
 (0.608) (0.592) (1.091) (0.331) 
Notes: This table reports multivariate tobit estimates, where independent variables are share of assets. Pooled SCF 
cross-sections of 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 are used for estimations. Standard errors are in parentheses *, **, 
and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Population weights are used.  
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Table 2.8 Asset Shares for the Representative Sample 
 
 Angel Share Owner Share Past Mngr. Share Risky Share 
Age -0.017** 0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.012) (0.001) 
Age2 0.000** -0.000*** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Some College -0.022 -0.001 0.119 0.043*** 
 (0.052) (0.019) (0.085) (0.007) 
Undergrad Degree 0.010 -0.075*** 0.061 0.064*** 
 (0.042) (0.019) (0.077) (0.007) 
Post-Grad Degree 0.031 -0.111*** 0.029 0.079*** 
 (0.044) (0.022) (0.080) (0.007) 
White 0.016 0.060*** 0.061 0.046*** 
 (0.046) (0.019) (0.105) (0.007) 
female 0.021 -0.144*** -0.082 0.007 
 (0.064) (0.028) (0.144) (0.009) 
Married 0.026 0.026 0.060 -0.023*** 
 (0.056) (0.022) (0.103) (0.008) 
Kids Less 18 -0.010 0.005 -0.019 -0.016*** 
 (0.015) (0.007) (0.027) (0.002) 
Self-Employed Head 0.152***  0.117 -0.071*** 
 (0.037)  (0.078) (0.009) 
Employer Tenure -0.005*** 0.008*** -0.009*** 0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) 
2001 0.003 -0.042* -0.091 0.011 
 (0.043) (0.022) (0.085) (0.007) 
2004 -0.011 -0.036 -0.058 -0.033*** 
 (0.046) (0.022) (0.084) (0.008) 
2007 -0.029 -0.048** -0.051 -0.028*** 
 (0.044) (0.021) (0.080) (0.007) 
2010 -0.105** 0.020 -0.060 -0.033*** 
 (0.046) (0.020) (0.074) (0.007) 
Log(Income+1) -0.004  -0.038** 0.022*** 
 (0.017)  (0.018) (0.003) 
Log Net Worth 0.156*** 0.163*** 0.189*** 0.056*** 
 (0.019) (0.006) (0.028) (0.002) 
Expect Inheritance 0.118*** -0.013 0.060 0.013** 
 (0.033) (0.018) (0.073) (0.006) 
Received Inheritance 0.015 -0.000 0.012 0.015*** 
 (0.029) (0.015) (0.051) (0.005) 
High Risk Attitude 0.090* 0.026 0.121 0.168*** 
 (0.050) (0.020) (0.092) (0.007) 
Avg. Risk Attitude 0.045 -0.007 -0.021 0.127*** 
 (0.049) (0.018) (0.081) (0.006) 
Constant -2.566*** -2.435*** -3.598*** -0.938*** 
 (0.257) (0.092) (0.625) (0.033) 
Notes: This table reports multivariate tobit estimates, where independent variables are logarithms of asset values. 
Pooled SCF cross-sections of 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 are used for estimations. Standard errors are in 
parentheses *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Population weights are used.
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Table 2.9 Asset Values for the Top 1% 
 
 Log Angel 
Value 
Log Owner 
Value 
Log Past 
Mngr. Assets 
Log Risky 
Assets 
Age -0.698 0.456* 1.347 0.176 
 (0.732) (0.258) (1.246) (0.153) 
Age2 0.006 -0.006*** -0.009 -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.010) (0.001) 
Some College 6.309 0.801 1.376 1.320 
 (5.666) (1.500) (8.374) (0.898) 
Undergrad Degree 3.031 -0.169 5.999 2.457*** 
 (4.998) (1.320) (6.571) (0.742) 
Post-Grad Degree 6.611 -0.324 8.661 3.084*** 
 (4.929) (1.368) (6.949) (0.708) 
White -2.646 0.355 6.960 0.663 
 (4.338) (1.551) (7.178) (0.617) 
Female 6.636 -2.775 -24.073*** 0.593 
 (6.005) (2.138) (9.004) (0.883) 
Married 1.214 2.282 -5.494 -0.024 
 (3.688) (1.462) (6.147) (0.505) 
Kids Less 18 0.186 0.078 0.094 0.110 
 (1.022) (0.320) (1.827) (0.156) 
Self-Employed Head -0.753  -3.456 -1.324*** 
 (3.127)  (5.950) (0.320) 
Employer Tenure -0.045 0.268*** -0.347** -0.000 
 (0.078) (0.028) (0.146) (0.010) 
2001 4.776 -1.698 0.335 -0.275 
 (3.378) (1.173) (6.887) (0.359) 
2004 5.766* -0.487 -3.910 -0.441 
 (3.260) (1.117) (6.022) (0.364) 
2007 4.145 -0.328 -9.040 -0.823** 
 (3.358) (1.170) (6.123) (0.338) 
2010 5.496 -0.013 -7.733 -0.703** 
 (3.405) (1.116) (5.996) (0.305) 
Log(Income+1) 0.258  3.351* 0.359*** 
 (0.677)  (1.740) (0.121) 
Log Net Worth 3.167 4.946*** 8.599*** 0.662*** 
 (2.244) (0.624) (2.736) (0.162) 
Expect Inheritance 5.742** -0.291 2.276 -0.175 
 (2.474) (0.896) (5.089) (0.284) 
Received Inheritance 0.845 0.040 0.610 0.238 
 (2.086) (0.709) (4.214) (0.246) 
Log(Fin. Assets+1) 0.710 -3.096*** -5.691***  
 (1.074) (0.401) (2.098)  
Log(Home+1) 0.056 0.078 0.532 -0.017 
 (0.370) (0.197) (0.553) (0.051) 
Log(Vehicles+1) 0.148 -0.198** -0.153 0.062 
 (0.364) (0.094) (0.554) (0.040) 
High Risk Attitude 12.083* 1.046 16.738** 3.819*** 
 (6.355) (1.496) (7.055) (0.979) 
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Avg. Risk Attitude 10.188 1.617 15.418** 3.916*** 
 (6.313) (1.463) (7.230) (0.970) 
Constant -87.528** -38.858*** -211.226*** -13.902*** 
 (39.523) (10.902) (54.500) (5.297) 
Notes: This table reports multivariate tobit estimates, where independent variables are logarithms of asset values. 
Pooled SCF cross-sections of 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 constitute the data. Standard errors are in 
parentheses *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Population weights are used. 
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Table 2.10 Asset Values for the Representative Sample 
 
 Log Angel 
Value 
Log Owner 
Value 
Log Past 
Mngr. Assets 
Log Risky 
Assets 
Age -0.852** 0.295*** -0.357 -0.043 
 (0.341) (0.108) (0.689) (0.027) 
Age2 0.006** -0.005*** 0.004 -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.006) (0.000) 
Some College -1.774 1.463** 5.748 1.342*** 
 (2.826) (0.631) (4.537) (0.180) 
Undergrad Degree -0.277 0.079 3.653 1.804*** 
 (2.262) (0.604) (4.325) (0.184) 
Post-Grad Degree 0.988 -0.697 2.759 1.974*** 
 (2.370) (0.690) (4.385) (0.197) 
White 1.258 3.600*** 2.947 1.625*** 
 (2.391) (0.640) (5.892) (0.176) 
Female 1.700 -3.254*** -1.709 0.567** 
 (3.448) (0.896) (8.219) (0.239) 
Married 1.556 3.119*** 4.627 0.431** 
 (3.074) (0.703) (5.819) (0.208) 
Kids Less 18 -0.412 0.177 -1.238 -0.196*** 
 (0.789) (0.206) (1.456) (0.063) 
Self-Employed Head 6.854***  4.871 -4.344*** 
 (2.005)  (4.077) (0.264) 
Employer Tenure -0.212*** 0.290*** -0.420*** 0.068*** 
 (0.069) (0.019) (0.153) (0.007) 
2001 0.257 -0.951 -4.300 0.001 
 (2.321) (0.699) (4.610) (0.194) 
2004 -0.255 -1.070 -2.612 -0.277 
 (2.410) (0.698) (4.580) (0.210) 
2007 -1.174 -0.955 -2.593 -0.218 
 (2.313) (0.684) (4.316) (0.203) 
2010 -5.593** 1.255* -3.154 -0.264 
 (2.350) (0.647) (4.020) (0.195) 
Log(Income+1) 0.531  -1.537 0.931*** 
 (0.837)  (1.096) (0.103) 
Log Net Worth 8.668*** 8.479*** 12.021*** 2.235*** 
 (0.971) (0.264) (1.601) (0.070) 
Expect Inheritance 6.460*** -0.087 3.095 0.376** 
 (1.715) (0.555) (3.772) (0.156) 
Received Inheritance 0.681 0.246 0.097 0.413*** 
 (1.519) (0.487) (2.777) (0.144) 
Log(Fin. Assets+1) 0.116 -2.299*** -1.540*  
 (0.567) (0.134) (0.906)  
Log(Home+1) -0.297 -0.600*** -0.198 -0.074*** 
 (0.219) (0.057) (0.426) (0.018) 
Log(Vehicles+1) 0.303 -0.172** 0.993 0.077*** 
 (0.263) (0.080) (0.581) (0.026) 
High Risk Attitude 4.819* 3.756*** 6.928 4.796*** 
 (2.658) (0.670) (4.894) (0.188) 
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Avg. Risk Attitude 2.192 2.317*** -1.023 3.865*** 
 (2.500) (0.619) (4.469) (0.165) 
Constant -151.628*** -98.581*** -209.432*** -35.287*** 
 (11.534) (3.144) (30.233) (1.082) 
Notes: This table reports multivariate tobit estimates, where independent variables are logarithms of asset values. 
Pooled SCF cross-sections of 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 constitude the data. Standard errors are in 
parentheses *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Population weights are used. 
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Table 2.11 Became an Angel for the Top 1% 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Age -0.140* -0.154** -0.203*** -0.197*** -0.174** 
 (0.074) (0.072) (0.072) (0.075) (0.077) 
Age2/10 0.010* 0.011* 0.015** 0.014** 0.012* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Some College -0.774 -0.666 -0.836 -0.677 -0.901 
 (0.686) (0.660) (0.654) (0.688) (0.729) 
Undergrad Degree -0.733 -0.620 -0.716 -0.707 -0.785 
 (0.455) (0.454) (0.500) (0.489) (0.479) 
Post-Grad Degree -0.292 -0.223 -0.316 -0.341 -0.503 
 (0.527) (0.519) (0.542) (0.549) (0.529) 
White 2.051*** 1.834*** 1.865*** 2.051*** 2.228*** 
 (0.448) (0.439) (0.438) (0.458) (0.564) 
Female 1.772** 2.191** 1.812** 1.598* 1.677* 
 (0.843) (0.862) (0.868) (0.862) (0.917) 
Married -0.364 -0.277 -0.156 -0.311 -0.293 
 (0.516) (0.519) (0.576) (0.520) (0.518) 
Kids Less 18 -0.135 -0.103 -0.063 -0.047 -0.043 
 (0.135) (0.129) (0.130) (0.131) (0.135) 
Employer Tenure 0.009 0.012 0.011 0.009 0.009 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Self-Employed Head 0.405 0.287 0.292 0.451* 0.531** 
 (0.294) (0.291) (0.292) (0.261) (0.252) 
Log(Income+1) -0.084 -0.084 -0.087 -0.118** -0.140** 
 (0.059) (0.063) (0.056) (0.057) (0.058) 
Log Fin. Net Worth 0.248** 0.257** 0.190* 0.228 0.392* 
 (0.121) (0.113) (0.113) (0.174) (0.223) 
Log Non-Fin. Wealth 0.221* 0.241* 0.273** 0.244 0.042 
 (0.127) (0.130) (0.134) (0.205) (0.250) 
High Risk Attitude 2.081*** 1.986*** 2.362*** 2.369*** 2.395*** 
 (0.527) (0.550) (0.748) (0.626) (0.725) 
Avg. Risk Attitude 1.522*** 1.377** 1.715** 1.674*** 1.775** 
 (0.540) (0.574) (0.735) (0.631) (0.743) 
Expect Inheritance  -0.799** -0.762** -0.729** -0.808** 
  (0.325) (0.359) (0.329) (0.329) 
Received Inheritance  0.244 0.123 0.175 0.225 
  (0.286) (0.280) (0.276) (0.264) 
Paid Credit Card Full   1.436*** 1.642** 1.721*** 
   (0.536) (0.643) (0.653) 
Charitable Time>1   0.207 0.270 0.253 
   (0.288) (0.315) (0.327) 
Invest. Shop None   0.219 0.282 0.303 
   (0.354) (0.367) (0.363) 
Invest. Shop Lot   0.496 0.459 0.432 
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   (0.319) (0.296) (0.286) 
Credit Constrained   -1.503** -1.285** -0.787 
   (0.587) (0.615) (0.743) 
Loan/Value of Home    -0.822 -0.317 
    (0.630) (0.646) 
Home Share Assets    0.175 1.764 
    (1.456) (1.638) 
Risky Fin. / Assets    -1.023 -0.592 
    (1.020) (0.940) 
Current Owner Share    -0.610 0.907 
    (0.769) (1.157) 
Spouse Self-Emp.     -0.658** 
     (0.318) 
Poor Health     -1.688 
     (1.037) 
Log(Debt/Assets+1)     -6.015* 
     (3.345) 
Inv. Real Estate Share     2.141 
     (1.398) 
Constant -6.158** -5.909* -5.939* -5.345 -6.166* 
 (2.949) (3.122) (3.237) (3.270) (3.479) 
Notes: This table reports probit estimates, where independent variables are indicators for becoming an angel investor 
between 2007 and 2009. The covariates are all measured in 2007. The sample consists of household who did not 
have angel investment equity in their portfolios in 2007 and were among the top 1% of net worth in 2007. Standard 
errors are in parentheses *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Population 
weights are used. 
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Table 2.12 Became an Angel for the Representative Sample 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Age 0.011 0.011 0.021 0.044 0.048 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.034) 
Age2/10 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Some College -0.130 -0.136 -0.174 -0.197 -0.217 
 (0.309) (0.311) (0.295) (0.288) (0.283) 
Undergrad Degree 0.120 0.109 0.043 0.059 0.040 
 (0.256) (0.256) (0.256) (0.258) (0.257) 
Post-Grad Degree 0.353 0.344 0.305 0.371 0.345 
 (0.277) (0.281) (0.273) (0.268) (0.257) 
White -0.036 -0.057 0.011 0.012 0.008 
 (0.247) (0.246) (0.239) (0.233) (0.228) 
Female -0.025 -0.024 0.029 0.104 0.101 
 (0.317) (0.315) (0.309) (0.305) (0.305) 
Married -0.189 -0.182 -0.163 -0.095 -0.096 
 (0.241) (0.238) (0.245) (0.233) (0.238) 
Kids Less 18 0.034 0.035 0.046 0.081 0.082 
 (0.078) (0.077) (0.082) (0.080) (0.078) 
Employer Tenure 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Self-Employed Head 0.430*** 0.431*** 0.480*** 0.347** 0.343** 
 (0.150) (0.148) (0.147) (0.170) (0.167) 
Log(Income+1) 0.007 0.010 0.025 0.036 0.031 
 (0.037) (0.036) (0.044) (0.040) (0.038) 
Log Fin. Net Worth 0.066 0.062 0.027 0.012 0.011 
 (0.051) (0.049) (0.052) (0.058) (0.059) 
Log Non-Fin. Wealth 0.224*** 0.221*** 0.208*** 0.144** 0.160** 
 (0.061) (0.060) (0.064) (0.056) (0.077) 
High Risk Attitude 0.107 0.105 0.107 0.049 0.041 
 (0.280) (0.282) (0.271) (0.280) (0.285) 
Avg. Risk Attitude -0.185 -0.191 -0.158 -0.203 -0.206 
 (0.257) (0.254) (0.249) (0.248) (0.250) 
Expect Inheritance  0.098 0.161 0.183 0.182 
  (0.186) (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) 
Received Inheritance  0.065 0.077 0.099 0.109 
  (0.148) (0.147) (0.145) (0.142) 
Paid Credit Card Full   0.483*** 0.506*** 0.509*** 
   (0.172) (0.176) (0.170) 
Charitable Time>1   0.024 0.002 0.003 
   (0.154) (0.152) (0.152) 
Invest. Shop None   -0.255 -0.288 -0.285 
   (0.224) (0.220) (0.220) 
Invest. Shop Lot   0.418*** 0.427*** 0.430*** 
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   (0.154) (0.158) (0.156) 
Credit Constrained   0.052 -0.093 -0.095 
   (0.307) (0.271) (0.257) 
Loan/Value of Home    -0.052 -0.150 
    (0.241) (0.185) 
Home Share Assets    -0.703** -0.786 
    (0.319) (0.546) 
Risky Fin. / Assets    -0.086 -0.060 
    (0.439) (0.472) 
Current Owner Share    0.560 0.563 
    (0.409) (0.577) 
Spouse Self-Emp.     -0.082 
     (0.236) 
Poor Health     -1.137*** 
     (0.337) 
Log(Debt/Assets+1)     0.419 
     (0.903) 
Inv. Real Estate Share     -0.077 
     (0.617) 
Constant -5.858*** -5.841*** -6.300*** -5.862*** -6.095*** 
 (1.053) (1.050) (0.931) (0.861) (0.813) 
Notes: This table reports probit estimates, where independent variables are indicators for becoming an angel investor 
between 2007 and 2009. The control variables are all measured in 2007. The sample consists of household who did 
not have angel investment equity in their portfolios in 2007. Standard errors are in parentheses *, ** and *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Population weights are used. 
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Table 2.13 Exited Angel Status for the Top 1% 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age 0.269 0.265 0.241 0.253 
 (0.228) (0.224) (0.212) (0.205) 
Age2/100 -0.181 -0.170 -0.163 -0.170 
 (0.179) (0.175) (0.170) (0.167) 
Some College -6.595*** -6.480*** -6.168*** -6.517*** 
 (1.060) (1.137) (1.034) (1.381) 
College Grad -2.584*** -2.576*** -2.837*** -2.849*** 
 (0.528) (0.610) (0.645) (0.792) 
Married -1.020 -1.028 -1.002 -0.730 
 (0.800) (0.824) (0.725) (0.908) 
Kids Less 18 0.109 0.112 0.114 0.135 
 (0.192) (0.191) (0.183) (0.160) 
Self-Employed Head 0.386 0.368 0.342 0.490 
 (0.432) (0.431) (0.405) (0.435) 
Log(Income+1) 0.077 0.081 0.041 0.125 
 (0.073) (0.071) (0.066) (0.078) 
Log Fin. Net Worth -0.186 -0.173 -0.066 -0.531* 
 (0.169) (0.170) (0.180) (0.277) 
Log Non-Fin. Wealth -0.684*** -0.693*** -0.670*** -0.513** 
 (0.166) (0.165) (0.168) (0.241) 
High Risk Attitude -1.171 -0.897 -0.024 0.564 
 (1.034) (1.012) (0.961) (1.323) 
Avg. Risk Attitude -0.708 -0.505 0.513 1.153 
 (0.925) (0.938) (0.963) (1.260) 
# of NAM Businesses -0.355** -0.366** -0.276** -0.300** 
 (0.154) (0.143) (0.132) (0.135) 
(NAM Businesses)2 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.014** 0.015** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Angel Share A -3.942 -3.962 -3.631** -3.557* 
 (2.504) (2.337) (1.717) (1.969) 
Expect Inheritance  0.232 0.106 0.526 
  (0.467) (0.372) (0.394) 
Received Inheritance  -0.347 -0.314 -0.841* 
  (0.416) (0.340) (0.438) 
Paid Credit Card Full   -1.301 -0.429 
   (0.809) (0.837) 
Charitable Time>1   0.498 0.617 
   (0.407) (0.430) 
Invest. Shop None   0.834* 0.949* 
   (0.447) (0.512) 
Invest. Shop Lot   -0.216 -0.637 
   (0.446) (0.540) 
Credit Constrained   1.577 1.673 
   (1.496) (1.902) 
Loan/Value of Home    0.163 
    (0.950) 
Home Share Assets    -4.191* 
    (2.361) 
Risky Fin. / Assets    2.965** 
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    (1.409) 
Current Owner Share    -0.424 
    (1.302) 
Constant 8.770 8.425 7.962 9.202 
 (7.838) (7.720) (7.391) (8.305) 
Notes: This table reports probit estimates, where independent variables are indicators for remaining an angel 
investor between 2007 and 2009. The control variables are all measured in 2007. The sample consists of household 
who had angel investment equity in their 2007 portfolios and were among the top 1% of net worth in 2007. Standard 
errors are in parentheses *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Population 
weights are used. 
 
 
  
130 
 
Table 2.14 Exited Angel Status for the Representative Sample  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age -0.167* -0.163* -0.228** -0.211* 
 (0.100) (0.096) (0.098) (0.110) 
Age2/100 0.176* 0.170** 0.245*** 0.229** 
 (0.090) (0.087) (0.090) (0.100) 
Some College -1.654 -1.646 -2.048* -2.581** 
 (1.022) (1.040) (1.161) (1.158) 
College Grad -1.734** -1.755** -2.581** -2.986*** 
 (0.840) (0.871) (1.022) (0.934) 
Married 0.295 0.334 0.784 0.844 
 (0.528) (0.550) (0.679) (0.699) 
Kids Less 18 -0.046 -0.040 0.027 0.008 
 (0.201) (0.197) (0.179) (0.176) 
Self-Employed Head -0.324 -0.361 -0.345 -0.611 
 (0.402) (0.394) (0.422) (0.479) 
Log(Income+1) -0.042 -0.048 -0.097 -0.040 
 (0.081) (0.082) (0.076) (0.089) 
Log Fin. Net Worth 0.014 0.001 0.178 0.373 
 (0.162) (0.153) (0.152) (0.281) 
Log Non-Fin. Wealth -0.247* -0.229 -0.377** -0.679*** 
 (0.149) (0.149) (0.157) (0.253) 
High Risk Attitude -0.566 -0.460 -0.799 -0.552 
 (0.617) (0.668) (0.818) (0.865) 
Avg. Risk Attitude -0.865 -0.787 -1.070 -0.772 
 (0.567) (0.621) (0.725) (0.763) 
# of NAM Businesses -0.154 -0.168 -0.155 -0.187 
 (0.143) (0.142) (0.148) (0.148) 
(NAM Businesses)2 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.011 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Angel Share A -3.867*** -3.853*** -4.239*** -2.003 
 (1.119) (1.101) (1.216) (1.743) 
Expect Inheritance  -0.142 0.252 0.308 
  (0.418) (0.443) (0.459) 
Received Inheritance  -0.135 -0.149 -0.361 
  (0.398) (0.408) (0.403) 
Paid Credit Card Full   -3.687*** -3.751*** 
   (0.817) (0.947) 
Charitable Time>1   0.546 0.741 
   (0.414) (0.465) 
Invest. Shop None   -1.134** -1.288** 
   (0.529) (0.554) 
Invest. Shop Lot   -0.507 -0.612 
   (0.453) (0.457) 
Credit Constrained   3.340*** 3.491*** 
   (0.806) (1.055) 
Loan/Value of Home    -0.781 
    (0.655) 
Home Share Assets    3.131* 
    (1.771) 
Risky Fin. / Assets    1.649 
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    (1.169) 
Current Owner Share    3.938** 
    (1.605) 
Constant 10.779*** 10.733*** 16.222*** 15.403*** 
 (2.811) (2.744) (3.137) (4.217) 
Notes: This table reports probit estimates, where independent variables are indicators for remaining an angel 
investor between 2007 and 2009. The control variables are all measured in 2007. The sample consists of household 
who had angel investment equity in their 2007 portfolios. Standard errors are in parentheses *, ** and *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Population weights are used. 
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2.8.2  Compositional Effects in the Top 1% 
Here, we address the question of whether compositions effects are important for determining 
angel participation among the wealthy. Table 2.15 shows that we can see a similar upward trend 
in the angel investments made by the top 5% and 10%. Moreover, no matter what the cutoff for 
wealth is, the rich have some of their lowest participation rates in 1998 which was a VC boom 
year. For the top 1% and 5%, we see a similar rise in participation after the financial crisis, 
where the participation falls for the lower percentiles.34  
Table 2.15 also shows that the angel equity provided by the 1% is consistently an important part 
of angel equity in the economy. We measure the relative importance of 1% by the share of angel 
equity they provide. In other words, we normalize the value of angel equity of the 1% by 
dividing it by the total angel equity, in order to reduce the effects of subjective valuations and 
volatility in asset prices.35 As it can be seen in the table, not only the top 1% provide more than 
two-thirds of the angel equity in the whole period, but the numbers are fairly consistent through 
time. The top 1% remain important in providing two-thirds or more of angel financing in all 
years. This also makes the analysis of the top 1% reassuring in terms of reflecting the aggregate 
trends in angel equity.36 
2.8.3  Computing Measures of Angel Status Change 
Here is a review of how we identify becoming angel and exiting from angel investor status. 
Who Did Become an Angel? 
A household became a NAM (non-actively managed) business owner if it didn’t own any NAM 
businesses in 2007 and ended up having at least one NAM in 2009. We then exclude two groups 
from those who became a non-actively managed business owner to capture those who become 
angel investors from a mixed combination of those who became angels or past managers. First, 
we exclude those who own, but don’t manage all previously actively managed businesses. 
Ideally we would like to know what exactly happened to each of the AM (actively managed) 
businesses in 2007, to make sure that the new NAM business in 2009 was not a previously AM 
business. However, we don’t have data on the dynamics of individual businesses owned by the 
household. SCF 2009 asks a questions from those who had AM businesses in 2007 and don’t 
                                                 
34 The oversampling of the wealthy in the SCF is largely in favor of the 1%, which makes the numbers for the 1% 
reliable even for unpooled data of each year. The yearly numbers for other percentiles may be subject to more errors, 
as there are less observations available for those. We have a yearly average of 160 (unweighted) observations of 
angel investors in the 1%, where the corresponding number for the bottom 99% is 83. 
35 These numbers could still be subject to large errors, resulted by differential asset prices among the assets held by 
the wealthy and the others, or systematic biases in subjective valuations. Hence, although these numbers are helpful 
in terms of addressing the concern about composition effects, we don’t read much into them. 
36 One may argue that the relative importance of the 1% of wealth is driven by the extremely rich among them. 
However, the relative importance of the top 1% is robust to excluding the wealthiest among the 1% of net worth. 
Even after excluding the top 0.05% of the net worth, the top 1% of net worth still own the majority of the angel 
equity in the economy. 
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own any such businesses anymore. It asks whether they still own the business and no longer 
manage, sold, went out of the business, or granted to another person. We exclude those whose 
answer to this question is that they still own, but no longer manage those businesses.  
Second, we exclude those who become an angel and used to be a past manager, by restricting the 
definition to those who didn’t have any actively managed businesses in 2007. It is a conservative 
assumption based on the perception that the past managers may be more likely to become a past 
manager for the AM businesses they own. Since we can’t track individual businesses, we omit 
all past managers in 2007 from our sample. This omission is also in line with our cross section 
definition that distinguished between angels and past managers.  
Who Did Discontinue Being an Angel? 
We define an exit from angel investment as being an angel in 2007, and being neither an angel 
nor a past manager in 2009.  
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Table 2.15 Different Cutoffs of Net worth 
 
 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 Pooled Years 
Panel A: Participation Rates 
Top 1% 0.13 0.19 0.2 0.19 0.22 0.18 
Top 5% 0.095 0.104 0.107 0.097 0.111 0.1 
Top 10% 0.06 0.076 0.072 0.076 0.072 0.07 
All 0.011 0.014 0.012 0.012 0.01 0.01 
Panel B: Share of Angel Equity 
Top 1% 0.7 0.75 0.66 0.65 0.76 0.71 
Top 5% 0.9 0.94 0.9 0.92 0.89 0.9 
Top 10% 0.93 0.97 0.94 0.97 0.97 0.94 
All 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Panel C: Average Deal Per Angel 
Top 1% 3.2 3.6 3 2.8 3.5 3.26 
Top 5% 2.1 2.6 2.1 2.3 2.6 2.33 
Top 10% 2 2.1 2 1.9 2.2 2.07 
All 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.7 2 1.74 
Panel D: Median Deal Per Angel 
Top 1% 1 2 2 1 2 2 
Top 5% 1 2 1 1 2 1 
Top 10% 1 1 1 1 1 1 
All 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Panel E: Third Quartile of “Deals Per Angel” Distribution 
Top 1% 3 4 3 2 3 4 
Top 5% 2 3 2 2 3 3 
Top 10% 2 2 2 2 2 2 
All 1 1 1 2 2 2 
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